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Conventional (single-prior) Bayesian games of incomplete information are limited in their
ability to capture the extent of informational asymmetry. In particular, they are not capable
of representing complete ignorance of an uninformed player about an unknown parameter of
the environment. Using a framework of contracting for delegated experimentation, we formu-
late and analyze a dynamic game of incomplete information that incorporates a multiple-prior
belief system. Speci￿cally, we consider a game with a principal contracting with an expert
agent for his (observable) e⁄ort on a novel experiment ￿ a Poisson process with unknown
hazard rate. Although the expert agent has su¢ cient knowledge to form a single prior over
the hazard rate, the principal initially has complete ignorance and her ambiguous beliefs are
represented by the set of all plausible prior distributions over the hazard rate. We propose a
new equilibrium concept ￿ Perfect Objectivist Equilibrium ￿ in which the principal, who
has ambiguity aversion, draws inference about the agent￿ s prior from the observed history of
the game via likelihood ratio tests. The new equilibrium concept thus also embodies a novel
model of learning under ambiguity in the context of a dynamic game. Although the game
is rich in its contractual space and strategic interactions, the unique (Markov) equilibrium
outcome is a remarkably simple pooling contract with appealing economic properties.￿Acknowledging what is known as known, what is not known as unknown, that is knowl-
edge.￿
￿Analects of Confucius
￿What has now appeared is that the mathematical concept of probability is inadequate
to express our mental con￿dence or di¢ dence in making such inferences, and that the math-
ematical quantity which appears to be appropriate for measuring our order of preference
among di⁄erent possible populations does not in fact obey the laws of probability. To dis-
tinguish it from probability, I have used the term ￿ likelihood￿to designate this quantity.￿
￿R. A. Fisher (1925)
1 Introduction
Ad hoc subjective belief is commonplace in many economic models of rational behavior.
Bayesian games, particularly, dynamic settings, often hinge on unexplained arbitrary prior
beliefs about the economic environment. Defenders of the Savage-Bayesian paradigm would
usually invoke the argument that inferences have to start from somewhere, so therefore an
unexplained (unique) prior is a necessity. At a fundamental level, this line of argument
has been exposed to be questionable in light of the recent literature on multiple priors and
ambiguity (see Gilboa, Maccheroni, Marinacci and Schmeidler or GMMS, 2010; Manski,
2008), according to which, a multiple-prior belief system should be the rule and the unique-
prior belief system is just an extreme exception. Epstein and Schneider (2007) further
illustrate that in a multiple priors setting, some form of likelihood inference can suitably
replace the familiar Bayesian inference.
In this paper, we use the example of ￿ contracting for delegated experimentation￿to illus-
trate that the ad hoc subjective element can indeed be removed from the selection of prior
distributions for a (dynamic) game of incomplete information. By allowing multiple prior
distributions, arbitrary restriction on the set of priors, such as uniqueness, becomes unnec-
essary. As a consequence, the (iterative) selection of priors, in addition to updating beliefs
based on them, becomes an ongoing process as the game is played. Learning (including
the selection of priors and updating of beliefs) under ambiguity is based on observational
facts and a likelihood function that is derived from the common knowledge of the game and
suitable concept of equilibrium, of which ad hoc unique prior is no part.1
Our illustrative model is based on the exponential bandit framework of Keller, Rady,
and Cripps (2005). A principal sponsors an expert agent to conduct a novel experiment ￿
a Poisson process with an uncertain binary (1 or 0) hazard rate. A breakthrough in the
experiment brings bene￿ts to both the principal and the agent, but it is ex ante uncertain
whether the problem that must be ￿cracked￿to achieve the breakthrough is actually solvable.
The agent must continually decide how much to invest in solving the problem, and the
1If the observational data are not contaminated by random noises, as is the case in our model, the
likelihood function degenerates and gives deterministic falsi￿cation of some subsets of hypotheses. The
logical status of the inference degenerates to deductive inference.
1investment of more funds can speed up the time of the breakthrough if the problem is indeed
solvable. This basic setting admits to a number of speci￿c economic applications, such as
government subsidization of basic scienti￿c research.
As an expert, the agent (a ￿ Bayesian￿player) has su¢ cient knowledge to form a unique
prior probability about whether the problem is solvable, and he updates his posterior prob-
ability according to the investment history in the absence of a breakthrough. Bayes Rule
dictates that the posterior probability decreases over time conditional on non-zero invest-
ment and absence of a breakthrough. The principal (a ￿ non-Bayesian￿player) ￿ who does
not know the agent￿ s prior belief (his ￿type￿ ) but who can observe the investment history ￿
relies on this history to infer the agent￿ s type. She must act on her ambiguous beliefs ￿ rep-
resented by multiple priors and posteriors about the agent￿ s type ￿ to determine how much
to compensate the agent at each point in time. The principal￿ s de￿ciency of information
about the true state of the world means that she cannot form complete pairwise rankings
over alternative action plans (even without strategic uncertainty). In general, then, there
may not exist any unanimous winners among all candidate action plans. How this potential
indecision is resolved depends critically on the principal￿ s attitude toward ambiguity. We
follow GMMS (2010) to represent this factor of decision making by the maxmin expected
utility criterion.23
Our paper makes four main contributions. First, we formulate and analyze a dynamic
game of incomplete information with a multiple-prior belief system, as opposed to the con-
ventional (single-prior) Bayesian game, a la Harsanyi (1967, 1968).4 The game we analyze is
rich in strategic interactions, full of potential for multiplicity of equilibria, and would be ex-
pected to generate equilibria that would be sensitive to the choice of a prior. Yet, we ￿nd that
the equilibrium outcome can be implemented by a remarkably simple (pure strategy) pooling
contract in which the principal compensates the agent with a cost-reimbursement contract
with a time invariant reimbursement rate. The information transmission in equilibrium is
minimal, but it is adequate to ensure that the investment intensity and the cumulative level
of investment are Pareto e¢ cient (allowing for compensation transfer).5 Second, by devel-
oping a model that involves both learning (i.e., how a ￿ non-Bayesian￿player learns) under
ambiguity and strategic interactions between rational players, we add to and complement
the emerging literature on learning under ambiguity (Epstein and Schneider, 2003, 2007).
2In the paper we also formally establish the equivalence between the maxmin expected utility criterion and
the maxmin utility criterion for our setting, therefore we equivalently adopt the maxmin criterion originated
by Abraham Wald (1950) in his ￿Statistical Decision Functions￿ .
3More precisely, the maxmin expected utility criterion is only a necessary condition for a most preferred
action plan. To ensure su¢ ciency, a most preferred action plan must not be weakly dominated by any
feasible alternative. This additional necessary condition was originally proposed by Manski (2008).
4Inspired by the title of Harsanyi￿ s seminal paper ￿ ￿Games with Incomplete Information Played by
￿ Bayesian￿ Players￿ ￿ A ￿tting alternative title of the current paper could be ￿A Dynamic Game with
Incomplete Information Involving A ￿ Non-Bayesian￿Player￿ .
5The notion of socially e¢ cient allocation adopted in this paper is based on Pareto e¢ ciency and the
compensation principle, which states that the winner(s) must compensate the loser(s). The compensation
transfer, which is potentially socially costly, is explicitly modelled. Whenever Pareto e¢ ciency is subject to
informational constraints, the latter are fully re￿ ected in the representation of preferences.
2Third, to analyze our dynamic game, we present a new equilibrium concept ￿ the Perfect
Objectivist Equilibrium (POE) ￿ which extends and contrasts the familiar Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium (PBE) that is the standard in dynamic (single-prior) Bayesian games. The term
￿ objectivist￿emphasizes the importance of objective inference rules in the learning process.
The new equilibrium concept also allows us to deal with out-of-equilibrium updating of be-
liefs in a systematic way. Fourth, for the ￿showcase￿application of the model ￿ government
funded basic R&D ￿ the presence of ambiguity provides a rationale for why a government
might prefer a simple subsidy scheme ￿ in particular, an open-ended matching subsidy ￿
as opposed to more complex schemes or schemes that put more constraints on the subsidy
recipient, such as time-limited block grants or earmarked subsidies.
The e¢ ciency, uniqueness, robustness and simplicity of the (Markov) equilibrium outcome
in our model are especially noteworthy. We start by noting that a conventional (single-prior)
Bayesian game of incomplete information is limited in its ability to model the extent of in-
formational asymmetry. Particularly, it is not capable of representing complete ignorance
of an uninformed player about an unknown parameter of the environment, as is the case
in our model. The reason is simple: in a single-prior Bayesian game the belief of an unin-
formed player is represented by a single probability distribution, which is always informative
to some extent. This biases the extent of informational asymmetry downward. In contrast,
this modelling bias is overcome by our multiple prior model, which can represent complete
ignorance adequately. That is, the multiple-prior model allows more extreme asymmetry of
information between the principal and agent than a conventional Bayesian game does. As
a result, our analysis shows that ambiguity and ambiguity aversion weaken the principal￿ s
ability to minimize the agent￿ s information rent. In e⁄ect, the principal becomes so passive
in minimizing the agent￿ s information rent that the contract she o⁄ers does not sacri￿ce the
e¢ ciency of investment in a trade o⁄ to extract more expected surplus from trade. Con-
sequently, there exists a unique Markov equilibrium outcome, which is also Pareto e¢ cient
(allowing for compensation transfer). The Markov equilibrium outcome is robust in the sense
that it does not delicately depend on any ad hoc prior belief and out-of-equilibrium posterior
belief. Due to Pareto e¢ ciency it is also robust in that it is renegotiation-proof. The Markov
equilibrium outcome is also very simple both structurally and dynamically. The main reason
for this is the principal￿ s lack of ability to fully commit to predetermined contractual terms
after new information is revealed by the agent, which is a reasonable assumption that we
make. This lack of commitment ability by the principal makes the agent wary of and strate-
gically withholding revelation of sensitive information, which could be used by the principal
against the agent￿ s interest in the future. With the information transmission from the agent
to the principal being very limited, pooling contract arises and there is little incentive for
the principal to alter the terms over time.
Our model of multiple-prior belief system is built upon the axiomatic foundation laid
by GMMS (2010), which, in turn, is a synthesis of two main strands of multiple-prior (ax-
iomatic decision-theoretic) models following the pioneering works of Bewley (1986, 2002) and
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). In comparison with the axiomatic foundation of the subjec-
3tive probability theory6 (notably, the popular version by Anscombe and Aumann (1963)),
GMMS (2010) propose less restrictive sets of axioms for a pair of rational preference relations
(representing objective rationality and subjective rationality respectively). Based on these
more reasonable sets of rationality axioms, GMMS (2010) prove that the degree of rational
belief of a decision maker, as revealed by hypothetical betting behavior, is represented by a
set of (multiple) prior distributions (hence ambiguity), as opposed to the Savage-Bayesian
unique-prior belief system. Since the multiple prior belief system makes the subjective ex-
pected utility theory unworkable, GMMS (2010) also provide an axiomatic foundation for
the minimum expected utility theory, which is a substitute for the subjective expected utility
theory.
Our model of learning under ambiguity is closely related to the seminal work of Epstein
and Schneider (2007) that introduces the idea of using likelihood ratio test as a procedure
for reevaluating prior distributions. Our paper adopts the likelihood inference as a generic
replacement of Bayesian inference to avoid the ad hoc choice of unique prior distribution. We
show that for learning under ambiguity, Bayesian updating (through application of Bayes￿
Theorem) is duplicated by the iterative selection of priors (through likelihood ratio test).
We also show, in our particular game-theoretic setting, the choice of critical value for the
likelihood ratio test has no e⁄ect on inference. While Epstein and Schneider (2007) model
learning about a memoryless (data generating) mechanism, we model a data generating
mechanism that is history dependent. Therefore the two models are complementary. The
multiple-prior likelihood inference we adopt can be seen as a novel synthesis of ideas from
the three competing philosophies7 of statistics: Bayesian (e.g., Bayes￿Theorem), frequentist
(e.g., hypothesis testing theory) and Fisherian (e.g., likelihood and su¢ ciency). A central
theme of this new synthesis is the realization that a single prior (or posterior) probability
distribution is not a su¢ cient statistic to summarize existent information8, while multiple
prior distributions plus likelihoods more adequately represent knowledge (and ignorance9).
Our paper is related to, but quite di⁄erent from, Horner and Samuelson￿ s (2009) analysis
of incentives for experimenting agents. Like this paper, they consider repeated interaction
between a principal and an agent to whom experimentation has been delegated. However,
the emphasis in their paper is on the implications of hidden action by the agent in a setting in
which the principal has a prior belief about the viability of the experiment. In this paper, the
agent￿ s action is observable and contractible, and we emphasize the implications of ambiguity
6The subjective probability theory was pioneered by Ramsey (1926), de Finetti (1937) and Savage (1954).
7According to Efron (1998): ￿the development of modern statistical theory has been a three-sided tug
of war between the Bayesian, frequentist and Fisherian viewpoints￿ . ￿In many ways the Bayesian and
frequentist philosophies stand at opposite poles from each other, with Fisher￿ s ideas being somewhat of a
compromise￿ . ￿The world of applied statistics seems to need an e⁄ective compromise between Bayesian
and frequentist ideas.￿While the ￿Fisherian synthesis￿is expected to continue to do very well in the 21th
century, a ￿new synthesis￿may also emerge.
8This statement is clearly Fisherian in spirit (see the quote from Fisher (1925).)
9To adequately represent knowledge, it is important to indicate what is known, but also what is not
known (see the quote from Analects of Confucius). It is now well known (see Edwards 1992, pp. 57-61) that
a single probability distribution cannot accurately represent complete ignorance.
4and ambiguity-aversion on the part of the principal.
The paper is organized in seven sections. Section 2 describes the model of delegated
experimentation that forms the basis of our analysis. Section 3 explains formally what we
mean by ambiguity, and lays out the basic structure of the game we analyze. Section 4 de￿nes
the Perfect Objectivist Equilibrium and lays the foundations for characterizing it in our
model. Section 5 proceeds through a set of steps to characterize Markov Perfect Objectivist
Equilibrium outcome for our model. We ￿rst characterize and establish the existence of a
pooling Markov perfect objectivist equilibrium. We then show that this pooling equilibrium
is Pareto e¢ cient (allowing for compensation transfer). Finally we establish the uniqueness of
Markov equilibrium outcome. Section 6 discusses the economic implications and signi￿cance
of our results. Section 7 summarizes and concludes. Proofs of all results are in the Appendix.
2 Basic Model Formulation
The objective of this paper is to incorporate ambiguity into a dynamic game-theoretic setting
with incomplete information. A natural setting in which an interesting form of ambiguity
can arise is a model of dynamic experimentation of the sort analyzed by Keller, Rady, and
Cripps (2005). We assume that a principal hires an expert agent to solve a problem which
may or may not be solvable. We refer to solving the problem as a ￿breakthrough.￿If the
agent achieves a breakthrough, the principal receives a ￿prize￿equal to ￿P > 0. The agent
also receives a prize equal to ￿A > 0.
Neither the principal nor the agent knows for certain that the problem is solvable. Specif-
ically, let ! be a binary variable about the solvability of the problem, where ! = 0 means
a breakthrough can never occur; otherwise, the arrival of a breakthrough follows a Poisson
process (to be described below). The realization of ! is unknown to both the principal and
the agent unless a breakthrough occurs. However, the agent￿ s expertise is re￿ ected in his
past experience and knowledge of scienti￿c facts that enable him to form a prior probability
p0 ￿ Pr(! = 1) 2 [0;1] that a solution exists. The experience and scienti￿c facts that
underpin p0 are unknown to the principal and are thus private information to the agent.
Therefore, p0 can be interpreted as the agent￿ s unobservable type. In contrast to the con-
ventional Bayesian approach in which the principal would have a given prior belief about p0
(￿a prior over the prior￿ ), we assume that the principal in general has multiple prior beliefs
over possible values of p0, an assumption which has important implications for our analysis
and which we discuss in greater detail below. The multiple prior assumption allows for the
realistic possibility that the principal simply does not know what to believe about p0, and
it captures, as a special case, the possibility of complete ignorance in which the principal
believes that any prior belief about p0 is conceivable.
Conditional on the problem having a solution, the time at which the breakthrough occurs
is random, but it can be in￿ uenced by the intensity of the agent￿ s investment in problem-
solving activities. At each instant t in continuous time, the agent has at most one unit of a
resource it can invest in problem solving. If the level of the agent￿ s investment is kt 2 [0;1],
then conditional on the problem being solvable, the hazard rate of a breakthrough is ￿ktdt,
5where ￿ > 0 is a parameter whose reciprocal 1
￿ is the expected time to a breakthrough when
the agent invests ￿￿ at out￿(k = 1). The marginal cost of the resource is a > 0 per unit, so
the agent￿ s total investment cost is C (kt) = akt.
The agent￿ s investment at each instant in time is assumed to be observable and con-
tractible, so the contract by which the principal compensates the agent can be conditioned
on kt. Speci￿cally, let I (ktjzt;yt;￿t) be the payment from the principal to the agent for the
period [t;t + dt). We assume that
I (ktjzt;yt;￿t) =
￿
yt + ￿ta(kt ￿ zt) if kt ￿ zt;
0 otherwise (1)
This payment schedule is a modi￿ed two-part tari⁄with a minimum investment requirement:
￿ zt 2 [0;1] is the minimum investment mandated by the principal for the agent to be
eligible for compensation.
￿ yt 2 [azt;1) is a lump-sum payment the agent receives, provided it satis￿es the man-
dated minimum investment level. If yt = azt, the principal exactly reimburses the agent
its mandated investment costs, while if yt > ￿zt, the agent￿ s ￿xed payment exceeds
the minimum mandated investment cost.
￿ ￿t 2 [0;1] is the reimbursement rate for the agent￿ s investment costs.
For any posterior probability pt that the problem is solvable, the agent￿ s (rate of ￿ ow of)
instantaneous utility is
vt = ￿ktpt￿A + I (ktjzt;yt;￿t) ￿ akt
=
￿
￿ktpt￿A + (yt ￿ azt) ￿ a(1 ￿ ￿t)(kt ￿ zt) if kt ￿ zt
￿ktpt￿A ￿ akt otherwise : (2)
The principal￿ s instantaneous utility is
ut = ￿ktpt￿P ￿ (1 + ￿)I (ktjzt;yt;￿t) + ￿vt
=
￿
￿ktpt(￿P + ￿￿A) ￿ ((1 + ￿ ￿ ￿)￿t + ￿)akt ￿ (1 ￿ ￿ + ￿)(yt ￿ ￿tazt) if kt ￿ zt
￿ktpt(￿P + ￿￿A) ￿ ￿akt otherwise : (3)
where ￿ ￿ 0 is an administrative cost incurred by the principal of transferring payment
to the agent, and ￿ 2 [0;1] is a distributional parameter indicating the relative weight the
principal places on the agent￿ s welfare. Throughout we maintain
Assumption 1 ￿
h
￿P
1+￿ + ￿A
i
￿ a:
This condition (which can be rewritten as
￿￿A
a ￿ 1￿ ￿
a
￿P
1+￿) puts a (rather weak) lower bound
on the ratio of the agent￿ s private marginal bene￿t of k to its marginal cost of k for a problem
known to be solvable.
6Assumption 2 ￿ + 1 ￿ ￿ > 0:
This condition rules out the case in which ￿ = 0 and ￿ = 1 (where yt is a pure transfer that
the principal does not care about).
Our generic principal-agent model has a number of potential applications, such as con-
tracting inside a ￿rm or contracting between independent ￿rms, with a each application
having implications for natural values of parameters such as ￿A, ￿P, and ￿. Our ￿showcase￿
application (which we discuss in more detail in Section 6) is government funding of basic
scienti￿c R&D. In this application, the principal is a social welfare-maximizing government
that subsidizes an R&D project conducted by a private ￿rm or non-pro￿t organization that
may or may not yield a breakthrough. The ￿rm￿ s prize ￿A is the privately appropriable
value of the R&D breakthrough. The government￿ s objective is ￿P+ ￿A, where ￿P is the
non-appropriable social value of the breakthrough. (Note that this objective function thus
implies ￿ = 1.) The parameter ￿ > 0 is the marginal cost of public funds (e.g., due to the
need to raise funds through distortionary taxes). In this application, a contract in which
yt = azt (with ￿t = 0) would be a restricted (or earmarked) grant, i.e., where the funding
speci￿cally compensates the recipient for investing zt in the project at time t. By contrast,
a contract in which zt = 0 and ￿t = 0, but yt > 0 would be an unrestricted (or no-strings)
grant, i.e., where the funding is provided with no speci￿c requirement that the recipient use
it to invest in the project. Finally, a contract in which ￿t > 0 but yt = 0 and zt = 0 would be
a (pure) matching grant in which the government reimburses the recipient ￿t for every dollar
invested in the project. These grants can be used alone or in combination; they could be
time limited (applicable to particular t), and the terms of the grants could change over time.
Or they could be provided inde￿nitely until a breakthrough occurs. The contract space for
this application thus admits to a broad array of funding schemes used in practice.10
2.1 Limiting Case: Investment without Contract
To shed light on the basics of the problem, we start by studying the limiting case: the
investment in the absence of any contract between the principal and the agent. In the R&D
application, this would be the decentralized status quo with no government funding. Suppose
that the principal knew p0 then the principal￿ s most preferred pro￿le of investment, kP(pt),
is a special case of what Keller, Rady, and Cripps (2005) call the cooperative solution. Let
kA(pt) be the agent￿ s most preferred investment pro￿le.
10A similar application would be the case where the principal is a national educational ministry (such as
the Department of Education in the U.S.) and the agent is a state or city board of education. The project
would represent an attempt to implement an innovation in K-12 education (such as the school accountability
plans submitted by states in the Obama Administration￿ s ￿Race to the Top￿program) at the local level. ￿P
is the national value of the breakthrough, while ￿A is the value of implementing the breakthrough locally. If
the national ministry cares about outcomes at the local level then ￿ 2 (0;1]. The parameter ￿ represents the
marginal cost of public funds plus the incremental administrative costs of a⁄ecting the transfer between the
national ministry and the local board. The compensation function I (ktjzt;yt;￿t) embodies three common
features of intergovernmental transfers: a restricted grant, azt, a matching grant, ￿ta(kt ￿ zt), and an
unrestricted grant yt ￿ azt.
7Proposition 1 In the absence of any contract between the principal and the agent, the
principal￿ s most preferred investment pro￿le is given by
k
P(pt) =
￿
1 if pt 2 (pP;1]
0 if pt 2 [0;pP] ; (4)
where pP is given by11
p
P =
￿a
￿(￿P + ￿￿A)
2 [0;1): (5)
The agent￿ s most preferred investment pro￿le is given by
k
A(pt) =
￿
1 if pt 2 (pA;1]
0 if pt 2 [0;pA] ; (6)
where pP is given by
p
A = min
￿
a
￿￿A
;1
￿
> p
P:
Both the principal￿ s and the agent￿ s most preferred investment pro￿les specify maximum
investment intensity as long as the posterior belief exceeds a belief cuto⁄, and no investment
otherwise.12 Depending on p0, two paths could be followed: if p0 ￿ pP, the principal would
prefer no investment at all; if p0 > pP she would prefer maximum investment intensity
until a breakthrough occurs or the posterior falls to pP, whichever comes ￿rst. Note that
if ￿ = 0 (the principal does not ￿care￿ about the agent￿ s welfare), the principal prefers
maximum investment intensity no matter what. (In this case, solving the problem is a
free option from the principal￿ s perspective.) The agent￿ s most preferred investment could
follow two similar paths. The di⁄erence between the two players is that the agent￿ s cuto⁄
pA = min
n
a
￿￿A;1
o
> pP is strictly greater than the principal￿ s.
Now, consider the evolution of posterior beliefs as a function of investment levels. Let
pt (Kt;p0) = Pr(! = 1jno breakthrough by time t)
where Kt ￿
R t
0 k￿d￿ is cumulative investment through time t. The law of motion for
pt (Kt;p0) is determined by Bayes￿Rule (applied to a Poisson process), and given by
pt+dt (Kt+dt;p0) =
pt (Kt;p0)e￿￿ktdt
(1 ￿ pt (Kt;p0)) + pt (Kt;p0)e￿￿ktdt;
11Straightforward algebra establishes that given Assumptions 1 and 2,
￿a
￿(￿P+￿￿A) < 1.
12The belief cuto⁄ is akin to a cost-bene￿t ratio, as can be illustrated for the R&D application. When
￿ = 1, the cuto⁄ is given by a
￿(￿P+￿A). Now, let e T be the random time to discovery for a project that is
certain to be viable. With hazard rate ￿ and ￿ at-out investment at any point in time, e T is an exponential
random variable with parameter ￿. The ex ante expected social bene￿t of a viable R&D project would be
(￿P + ￿A)E
h
e￿r e T
i
, which equals
￿(￿P+￿A)
￿+r . The ex ante expected cost of a viable R&D project would be
R 1
0 a
￿R t
0 e￿r￿d￿
￿
￿e￿￿tdt which can be shown to equal a
r+￿. The ex ante cost-bene￿t ratio is thus a
￿(￿P+￿A):
8where (1 ￿ pt (Kt;p0)) = Pr(! = 0jno breakthrough by t) and
e￿￿ktdt = Pr(no breakthrough in (t;t + dt]jno breakthrough by t;! = 1). The law of mo-
tion can also be expressed as
dpt(Kt;p0)
dt = limdt!0
pt(Kt;p0)(1￿pt(Kt;p0))(e￿￿ktdt￿1)
(1￿pt(Kt;p0))+pt(Kt;p0)e￿￿ktdt
= ￿￿ktpt (Kt;p0)(1 ￿ pt (Kt;p0)):
It is routine to verify the following closed-form solution of the law of motion:
pt (Kt;p0) =
1
1 +
1￿p0
p0 e￿Kt:
In the special case of constant investment k￿ = 1 for ￿ 2 [0;t], Kt = t, and
pt (t;p0) =
1
1 +
1￿p0
p0 e￿t:
Interestingly, this Poisson process with uncertain binary hazard rates is equivalent to a
Poisson process with a certain time-varying hazard rate given by ￿ktpt (Kt;p0).13
Let KP (p0) and KA (p0) denote the cumulative investment levels preferred by the prin-
cipal and agent respectively. Then KP (p0) and KA (p0) must satisfy the following identities:
p
P ￿
1
1 +
1￿p0
p0 e￿KP(p0);
p
A ￿
1
1 +
1￿p0
p0 e￿KA(p0):
It follows that
K
P (p0) =
1
￿
ln
2
4
(1￿pP)
pP
(1￿p0)
p0
3
5
and
K
A (p0) =
1
￿
ln
2
4
(1￿pA)
pA
(1￿p0)
p0
3
5 < K
P (p0) since p
A > p
P: (7)
That is, in the absence of any contract, the agent￿ s preferred level of cumulative investment
is always below what the principal prefers most. Put it di⁄erently, the agent always ter-
minates the investment earlier than the principal￿ s most preferred time (in the absence of
a breakthrough). This demonstrates the need of a contract for the two players to achieve
mutually favorable trade.
13To see this, let NB = ￿no breakthrough￿ , then
Pr(NB in [t;t + dt)jNB by time t) =
Pr(NB by time t+dt)
Pr(NB by time t) =
p0e
￿￿Kt+dt+(1￿p0)
p0e￿￿Kt+(1￿p0)
=
p0+(1￿p0)e
￿Kt+dt
p0+(1￿p0)e￿Kt e￿￿ktdt =
pt
pt+dte￿￿ktdt = e￿dlnpte￿￿ktdt = e￿￿ptktdt:
The last equality uses dlnpt = ￿￿kt (1 ￿ pt)dt which follows from the law of motion
dpt
dt = ￿￿ktpt (1 ￿ pt).
92.2 A Basic Incentive Problem
In this sub-section, we illustrate the basic incentive problem that confronts the principal
agent contract. To sharpen the illustration, we ignore the agent￿ s participation constraint
by assuming the principal could simply instruct the agent how to invest. We want to show
that if the principal must rely on the agent to tell her what p0 is, then her most preferred
investment pro￿le cannot be implemented (in general) because it is not incentive compatible.
To see why, suppose the principal asks the agent to submit a report ^ p0 which she uses to
￿naively￿instruct the agent to exert maximum investment intensity for a period of time
equal to KP (^ p0).14 Given the true prior p0, the agent would report ^ p0 so that
p
A =
1
1 +
1￿p0
p0 e￿KP(^ p0):
This ensures that the agent invests at maximum intensity only as long as it takes to get to
his preferred belief cuto⁄ pA. Because pP < pA,
1
1 +
1￿p0
p0 e￿KP(^ p0) >
1
1 +
1￿p0
p0 e￿KP(p0);
and thus KP (^ p0) < KP (p0) which implies ^ p0 < p0. The principal￿ s most preferred invest-
ment is generally not incentive compatible because it would induce the agent to pretend to
be more pessimistic about the solvability of the problem than he really is. If a breakthrough
does not occur before time t = KP (^ p0), the agent￿ s investment in solving the problem is
thus unambiguously less than what the principal prefers.
In the ensuing sections, we present in greater detail our assumptions on observability,
commitment, and communication between the principal and the agent. We also discuss
learning under ambiguity and the solution concept we employ to analyze the game.
3 Ambiguity in a Dynamic (Di⁄erential) Game of In-
complete Information
3.1 Learning under Ambiguity
3.1.1 Observable Actions
The baseline payment yt and the minimum mandated investment zt determine the funda-
mental structure of the compensation contract (e.g., whether the contract involves linear
or non-linear pricing).15 We assume that the principal can commit ex ante to an evo-
lution of the contract structure over time by means of a long-term contract on (zt;yt)
14Conditional on the report ^ p0, this is a feasible ￿contract￿because we assume the principal can observe
the agent￿ s investment.
15If zt = 0 and yt = 0, then I (ktjzt;yt;￿t) = ￿takt and linear pricing is used for each t ￿ 0; otherwise,
non-linear pricing is involved.
10for all t ￿ 0. Speci￿cally, we assume that immediately prior to t = 0 the principal
can commit to an open loop policy with respect to yt and zt. For each t 2 [0;1) this
policy speci￿es a minimum investment mandate zt = e z1(t) and a lump-sum payment
yt = e y1(t). Formally, the policy, denoted by (z1;y1), can be expressed as a map such that
(z1;y1) 2 f(~ z1; ~ y1) : [0;1) ! [0;1] ￿ [0;1)j~ yt ￿ a~ zt;8t 2 [0;1)g.16 As noted above, for
the R&D application, this contract space includes a number of realistic structures, including
both restricted and unrestricted grants, as well as time-limited and inde￿nite grants.
By contrast, we treat the reimbursement rate ￿t as subject to a sequence of short-term
contracts. Thus, in the period [t ￿ dt;t), the principal announces the reimbursement rate
￿t, which is legally binding for the period [t;t + dt). Because there is a time gap between
the principal￿ s o⁄er ￿t and the agent investment action kt, these moves are sequential and
therefore kt can depend on ￿t.
Let 0￿2 and 0￿1 denote almost the same calendar time as t = 0, but with the logical
sequence: 0￿2 < 0￿1 < 0. At time t = 0￿2 the principal o⁄ers a menu of initial contracts
c 2 C =
￿
(Z;Y;￿)j
(Z (^ p0);Y (^ p0);￿(^ p0)) 2 [0;1]
1 ￿ [0;1)
1 ￿ [0;1];
Yt (^ p0) ￿ aZt (^ p0); ^ p0 2 [0;1]
￿
, where Z (^ p0) and
Y (^ p0) are functions de￿ned over time interval [0;1), ￿(^ p0) = ￿0, ^ p0 is the agent￿ s self-
declared lower bound of type. An initial contract is a bundle of a long-term contract in the
form of (z1;y1) and a short-term contract in the form of ￿0. Given any menu (Z;Y;￿) 2 C,
at time t = 0￿1, the agent of type p0 declares the lower bound of his type to be ^ p0 2 [0;1].
There is a default lower bound which is ^ p0 = 0 if the agent does not declare otherwise. Given
the realized pair (c; ^ p0) 2 C￿[0;1], an initial contract (z1;y1;￿0) 2 [0;1]
1￿[0;1)
1￿[0;1]
is uniquely determined by c(^ p0). The long-term contract is enforceable and terminates (im-
mediately) if and only if breakthrough occurs.17
Denote by Ht the set of all possible histories for the period [0;t], de￿ned by
H
t =
￿
h
tjh
t =
￿
c; ^ p0;￿
t;k
t￿
;c 2 C; ^ p0 2 [0;1];￿
t = f￿￿j￿ 2 [0;t]g;k
t 2 fk￿0j￿
0 2 [0;t)g
￿
for t 2 [0;1).18 In addition, de￿ne the histories H0￿2 and H0￿1 such that H0￿2 = fh0￿2jh0￿2 = ?g
and H0￿1 = fh0￿1jh0￿1 = c 2 Cg. The realized history of observable actions, ht 2 Ht for
t 2 f0￿2;0￿1g[[0;1), which includes information of the initial contract, is public informa-
tion.
The principal￿ s action space Gt for time t ￿ 0 is given by Gt =
￿
￿t+dtj￿t+dt 2 [0;1]
￿
. Let
G0￿2 =
￿
g0￿2jg0￿2 = c 2 C
￿
and G0￿1 = ?, i.e., the principal does not move at t = 0￿1. The
agent￿ s action space Xt for time t ￿ 0 is given by Xt = Kt = fktjkt 2 [0;1]g. Let X0￿2 = ?
and X0￿1 =
￿
x0￿1jx0￿1 = ^ p0 2 [0;1]
￿
. Thus, prior to t = 0, the principal and the agent move
16We assume the principal can commit to this long-term contract on (zt;yt) for t ￿ 0 through a third
party enforcement mechanism.
17If the agent were to stop investing, the long-term contract is still valid and gives the agent the option
to resume investing and claim payments in the future. Thus, the decision by the agent not to exercise the
option does not invalidate the option.
18Throughout the paper, we use subscript t to refer to actions or contract terms at a given point in time
t, while we use superscript t to refer to histories of actions and contract terms up to time t.
11sequentially and the agent observes the principal action before he moves.
De￿ne a pure strategy for the principal, denoted by sP, as a map sP : Ht ! Gt, 8t 2
f0￿2;0￿1g[[0;1). De￿ne a pure strategy for the agent, denoted by sA, as a map sA : Ht !
Xt, 8t 2 f0￿2;0￿1g [ [0;1). Denote by SP (respectively, SA) the set of all possible pure
strategies of the principal (respectively, agent). Thus, sP 2 SP and sA 2 SA. In keeping
with the standard assumptions in the di⁄erential games literature, we impose the following
regularity condition:19
Assumption 3 SP and SA are such that sP (ht;t) and sA (ht;t;p0) are continuous and dif-
ferentiable with respect to t almost everywhere.
Note that the history ht 2 Ht for t ￿ 0 contains information on ￿t, which is the contract
for period [t;t + dt). In contrast, the history ht does not contain information on kt. This
asymmetry re￿ ects the sequential relation between ￿t and kt. Also, (z1
t ;y1
t ), which is a
restriction of (z1;y1) to [t;1) is predetermined by time t = 0. The choice of kt can depend
on (z1
t ;y1
t ;￿t). The converse does not hold, i.e., the choice of ￿t cannot depend on kt. So
the principal at any point of time is a ￿rst mover or leader, and agent is a follower. The
principal has the ability to commit (e.g., it can commit to ￿t+dt at time t), but the agent
cannot to anything except to play the best responses. This asymmetry between the principal
and the agent in the sequence of moves and commitment ability gives the principal the ability
to coordinate the play of the game. The agent does have one potential advantage, though,
which is the asymmetry of information.
A pure strategy pro￿le s = (sP;sA) is a map
s :
￿￿
h
t;t;p0
￿
jh
t 2 H
t;t 2 f0￿2;0￿1g [ [0;1);p0 2 [0;1]
￿
! Gt ￿ Xt;
such that sP (ht;t) 2 Gt, sA (ht;t;p0) 2 Xt for all t 2 [0;1). Let S denote the set of
all almost everywhere continuous and di⁄erentiable pure strategy pro￿les, thus, s 2 S.
Note, the principal￿ s pure strategy sP (ht;t) does not depend on parameter p0, which is not
observable to her. In contrast, the agent￿ s strategy is a function of p0. At t = 0￿1 the
agent￿ s strategy de￿nes a revelation function R 2 R =
n
^ Rj ^ R(p0;c) 2 [0;1];c 2 C
o
, such
that sA (h0￿1;0￿1;p0) = R(p0;c) 2 X0￿1 for all p0 2 [0;1]. If
R(p0;c) ￿ p0 for all p0 2 [0;1];
then the revelation is said to be truthful based on the given c 2 C. If
R(p0;c) = p0 for all p0 2 [0;1];
then the revelation is said to be truthful and complete based on the given c 2 C.
The learnable parameter space is ￿ = f￿ = (!;p0)j(!;p0) 2 f0;1g ￿ [0;1]g. As noted
earlier, the principal initially lacks information about p0 and therefore holds multiple priors
19See Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), Chapter 13.
12about it. She can learn about p0 by observing the agent￿ s action history from ht. The
principal can logically infer the range of p0 from the data of history ht. The inference rule
involves a judgement about the equilibrium of the game. In principle, there could be multiple
inference rules if there were multiple equilibrium outcomes, or the data generating process
involved o⁄-equilibrium-path play. Although both multiplicity of priors and multiplicity
of inference rules can cause ambiguity, in the current paper, the emphasis is on multiple
priors. The justi￿cation for this emphasis is due to the assumption that the data-generating
mechanism is the play of the game along a pure strategy equilibrium path, which determines
the likelihood function uniquely.
3.1.2 The Principal￿ s Priors Over p0
The principal￿ s learning about ! depends on observing a breakthrough. Her belief about p0
is inferred from observational data on history ht. If ! = 1 and is revealed by a breakthrough,
the game ends and the data generating process stops without fully resolving the ambiguity
about p0.
We now formulate the principal￿ s multiple priors over p0. Each prior over p0 is a function
￿0 : ￿ ! [0;1], where ￿ is the Borel ￿-algebra of subsets of [0;1]. The set of all priors of
the principal denoted by M0, is de￿ned as M0 = f￿0j￿0 : ￿ ! [0;1]g.
The principal￿ s knowledge about the process determining realized histories of the game
is summarized by a set of likelihood functions
L =
￿
l : H
t ￿ ftg ￿ S ￿ fp0jp0 2 [0;1]g ! [0;1]jt 2 f0￿2;0￿1g [ [0;1)
￿
;
where l(￿;t;s;p0) is a conditional probability measure20 on Ht. For example, l(ht;t;s;p0) is
the probability of history ht conditional on (t;s;p0). Each duple (￿0;l) 2 M0￿L represents
a theory, where l re￿ ects the (structural) model speci￿cation and ￿0 is a distribution on the
value of the unknown parameter p0. If ￿0 is a Dirac measure (i.e., an indicator function)
given by
￿p0 (A) =
￿
1 if p0 2 A
0 if p0 = 2 A ;8A ￿ [0;1];
then ￿0 = ￿p0 represents a unique speci￿cation of the parameter value.
A likelihood function has the argument s, which is a strategy pro￿le. The likelihood is
plausible only if s is plausible. In principle, the likelihood could re￿ ect both ￿signal￿ (which
is the equilibrium of the game) and ￿noise￿ (which could include measurement error or out-
of-equilibrium play). In the current study, we abstract from all noise components, and as
a result, L is a singleton and thus l is unique for any given (t;s;p0). Multiplicity of like-
lihood only arises from multiplicity of s 2 S. We are only interested in a likelihood that
is derived from an equilibrium outcome that is selected by the players by some reasonable
20The likelihood l(￿;t;s;p0) is expressed as a probability over the observation space Ht; it is NOT a
probability over the parameter space [0;1]. Thus, l(ht;t;s;p0) does not obey the laws of probability when
ht is ￿xed and p0 is treated as a variable, e.g., the integration over p0 does not add up to one. That is why
we use the term ￿likelihood￿as opposed to ￿probability.￿
13equilibrium re￿nement condition when there can exist multiple equilibrium outcomes. If the
data generating mechanism is a pure strategy equilibrium, i.e., s = (sP;sA), then s deter-
mines an equilibrium path ((g1 (p0);x1 (p0))) for each given p0 2 [0;1]; thus, s determines
a unique conditional likelihood l(￿;￿;s;￿). Thereby only a unique conditional likelihood func-
tion l(￿;￿;s;￿) passes the likelihood ratio test (which will be speci￿ed presently) at each point
of time.
Denote by L0 (s) the restriction of L to s. L0 (s) is a singleton of conditional likelihood,
and l(￿;￿;s;￿) 2 L0 (s) represents the unique pure strategy equilibrium that the players
coordinate to play.
We assume that the principal lacks the ability to commit to any open-loop policy ￿
1 or
Markov (state-dependent) policy ￿t (￿) (for all t ￿ 0). Therefore, a no-commitment policy
￿
1 or ￿t (￿) is credible only if it is time consistent, i.e., a best response in all continuation
games. (The meaning of time consistency will become precise when we de￿ne and discuss
the solution concept in Section 4).
3.1.3 Likelihood Inference ￿ Iterative Selection of Priors and Updating
At each point of time, each theory duple (￿0;l) 2 M0￿L0 (s) competes with other members
to better explain the history data ht. In the absence of a breakthrough and the agent￿ s
voluntary declaration, the principal forms a set of posteriors against each realized history
ht. She (iteratively) selects the subset of prior distributions, each of which has to exceed
a critical value of likelihood of generating the data set ht. Denote by ￿t (￿jht;￿0;l) the
conditional probability measure, which is calculated by Bayes￿Rule
d￿t
￿
￿jh
t;￿0;l
￿
=
l(ht;t;s;￿)d￿0 (￿)
R 1
0 l(ht;t;s; ~ p0)d￿0 (~ p0)
; (8)
which implies
￿t
￿
Ajh
t;￿0;l
￿
=
R
p02A l(ht;t;s;p0)d￿0 (p0)
R 1
0 l(ht;t;s; ~ p0)d￿0 (~ p0)
: (9)
for all A 2 ￿. De￿ne the (generalized) likelihood (over distribution ￿0 as opposed to over
parameter p0), denoted by L(ht;t;s;￿0;l), as a functional over ￿0 2 M0, such that
L
￿
h
t;t;s;￿0;l
￿
=
Z 1
0
l
￿
h
t;t;s; ~ p0
￿
d￿0 (~ p0): (10)
Note, the (variable) argument of the functional is ￿0 while ht is ￿xed. Here, in general, a
hypothesis is expressed as a distribution ￿0 instead of a single parameter value p0. In the
special case that ￿0 (~ p0) is degenerated to a Dirac measure so ￿0 (~ p0) = ￿p0 (~ p0) then
L
￿
h
t;t;s;￿0;l
￿
=
Z 1
0
l
￿
h
t;t;s; ~ p0
￿
d￿p0 (~ p0) = l
￿
h
t;t;s;p0
￿
:
14From (9) and (10) it is apparent that conditional probability measure ￿t (￿jht;￿0;l) is well
de￿ned only if L(ht;t;s;￿0;l) > 0, that is, the theory duple (￿0;l) is not contradicted by the
observed history ht. In principle, there can be a continuum of competing theories (hypothe-
ses) that are candidate explanations for the observed history ht. Likelihood inference can
play a useful role to quantitatively assess the relative merits of these competing hypothe-
ses.21 Fixing the history ht and underlying strategy pro￿le s, the likelihood ratio between
hypotheses (￿0;l) and
￿
~ ￿0;~ l
￿
is given by
L(ht;t;s;￿0;l)
L
￿
ht;t;s; ~ ￿0;~ l
￿
and (￿0;l) is said to have more support from the data than
￿
~ ￿0;~ l
￿
if the above ratio is larger
than unity. Based on pair-wise likelihood ratios, the principal can discriminate among all
priors in M0. To formulate the likelihood inference procedure which is used by the principal,
let ￿ 2 (0;1] be the critical value of the likelihood ratio test the principal uses. Let the set
of all accepted posteriors against ht be given by
M￿
t (ht) =
8
<
:
￿t (ht;￿0;l)j￿0 2 M0;l 2 L0 (s);
L(ht;t;s;￿0;l) ￿ ￿max~ ￿02M0
~ l2L0(s)
L
￿
ht;t;s; ~ ￿0;~ l
￿
9
=
;
: (11)
Intuitively, the principal admits a posterior probability measure ￿t (ht;￿0;l) if and only
if ￿t (ht;￿0;l) is a Bayesian update of ￿0 2 M0 such that there exists l 2 L0 (s) and
the likelihood of (￿0;l), given by L(ht;t;s;￿0;l), is at least a fraction ￿ of the possible
maximum likelihood over all
￿
~ ￿0;~ l
￿
2 M0 ￿ L0 (s). In principle the choice of critical
value ￿ 2 (0;1] may potentially introduce an ad hoc subjective element into the inference
rule. This turns out not to be the case in our current game-theoretic context, since the
inference is entirely deductive. As has been established previously, for ￿t (ht;￿0;l) to be
well de￿ned, L(ht;t;s;￿0;l) > 0 is necessary. Consequently, for M￿
t (ht) to be well de￿ned,
max~ ￿02M0
~ l2L0(s)
L
￿
ht;t;s; ~ ￿0;~ l
￿
> 0 is necessary, that is, there must exist some
￿
~ ￿0;~ l
￿
2 M0 ￿
L0 (s) that is not contradicted by the data ht.
In the current paper, we are interested in learning through inferences that are based on
some notion of pure strategy equilibrium of the game. For a given pure strategy equilibrium,
a unique likelihood function can be established because a unique equilibrium path is deter-
mined for each realization of the state variable p0. That is, there exists a (forecast) map
f : S ￿ [0;1] ! H1 such that 8(s;p0) 2 S ￿ [0;1], f (s;p0) = h1 2 H1 predicts the entire
equilibrium path of the game (conditional on the absence of a breakthrough). Let ft (s;p0)
be the restriction of f (s;p0) to the set f0￿2;0￿1g[[0;t]. Therefore, ft (s;p0) is a prediction
of the history for the period f0￿2;0￿1g [ [0;t].
21For an authoritative account on likelihood inference, see Edwards (1992).
15De￿ne the conditional state space, denoted by P (ht), such that
P
￿
h
t￿
=
￿
p0 2 [0;1]jf
t (s;p0) = h
t￿
: (12)
The next theorem then states the updating of the principal￿ s belief through likelihood infer-
ence.
Theorem 1 Suppose s is a pure strategy pro￿le that is part of the prevalent equilibrium of
the game. Then L0 (s) = flg is a singleton such that
l
￿
h
t;t;s;p0
￿
= ￿ft(s;p0)
￿
h
t￿
=
￿
1 if ht = ft (s;p0)
0 if ht 6= ft (s;p0) ;
where ￿ft(s;p0) (ht) is a Dirac measure, and the set of all admissible posteriors against ht is
given by
M
￿
t
￿
h
t￿
=
￿
￿0 2 M0j￿0
￿
P
￿
h
t￿￿
= 1
￿
: (13)
It is a su¢ cient (but not necessary) condition for representing deductive inference to set the
critical value of the likelihood ratio test to ￿ = 1.
It is interesting to note, by (11) M￿
t (ht) is de￿ned as a set of posterior distributions,
which are the outcomes of applying Bayes￿Theorem. According to (13), M￿
t (ht) appears
to be a set of prior distributions, which is the subset of M0 that passes certain (iterative)
selection. This comparison reveals the fact that the e⁄ect of Bayesian updating on beliefs is
duplicated by the e⁄ect of selecting prior distributions by the likelihood ratio test. In this
result, we see a seamless synthesis of the ideas from the Bayesian, frequentist and Fisherian
schools of statistics.
The fact that the endogenous critical value of the likelihood ratio test can be set to ￿ = 1
is because in a pure strategy equilibrium, in the absence of measurement error, the principal
only makes deductive inferences which rule out all possibilities that are contradicted by
the observational evidence, but do not rule out any possibility that is consistent with such
evidence. In the language of classical hypothesis-testing theory, the probability of type I
error is set to be zero. As a matter of fact the updating from M0 to M￿
t (ht) is essentially
a truncation of the support of M0 (which is [0;1]) to P (ht). M￿
t (ht) admits all probability
measures whose supports lie within P (ht). When ￿ = 1 is chosen, the probability of type
II error is uniformly minimized but still positive.22 The fact (as revealed in the proof of
Theorem 1) that ￿ 2 (0;1] is su¢ cient for representing deductive inference implies that
inferential correctness is not sensitive to the choice of critical value ￿. Without loss of
generality, in the remainder of the paper, we con￿ne our analysis to the case ￿ = 1 is chosen.
Some remarks on two properties of M￿
t (ht) are in order: First, M￿
t (ht) = M0 if
l(ht;t;s;p0) = 0 for all ￿0 2 M0 and l 2 L0 (s), then
max~ ￿02M0
~ l2L0(s)
L
￿
ht; ~ ￿0;~ l
￿
= 0 and no prior can be rejected even if it has been previously re-
jected by ht0 for some t0 < t. This is because at time t all competing priors are contradicted
22Equivalently, the test is uniformly-most-powerful (U.M.P.).
16by data ht, and no prior prevails. Second, M￿
t (ht) ￿ M0. Therefore the set of all posteriors
is essentially a set of all priors that pass the likelihood ratio test. ￿0 is rejected by ht if
and only if ￿0 2 M0nM￿
t (ht). If ￿0 is rejected, the posterior for ￿0 is not well-de￿ned. We
denote not-well-de￿ned posterior for a given prior by 0
0. Thus
￿t
￿
￿jh
t;￿0;l
￿
=
0
0
only if ￿t
￿
￿jh
t;￿0;l
￿
= 2 M
￿
t
￿
h
t￿
:
While accommodating the notion of not-well-de￿ned posterior, we maintain that
￿
0
0
￿
0 = 0
and thus ￿t (￿jht;￿0;l)0 = 0.
Since the likelihood ratio test critical value can be set to ￿ = 1, all the non-rejected
priors are maximum likelihood estimators (MLE￿ s) under some likelihood functions. If the
observed history ht cannot be explained by any theory (hypothesis) (￿0;l) 2 M0 ￿ L0 (s),
then the history h￿ for all ￿ ￿ t cannot be explained by any theory and M￿
￿ (h￿) = M0
ensues. This particular formulation can apply to o⁄-equilibrium-path updating of beliefs.
3.1.4 Initial Revelation
In a pure strategy equilibrium, s is common knowledge to all players. Thus, s(h0￿1;0￿1;￿) =
(c;R) are common knowledge. Also, h0 = (c; ^ p0) is known by t = 0. From these, the principal
can deduce the set of plausible types of the agent to be
P (h0) = fp0 2 [0;1]jf0 (s;p0) = h0g
= fp0 2 [0;1]jR(p0;c) = ^ p0g:
It follows that,
M
￿
0
￿
h
0￿
=
￿
￿0 2 M0j￿0
￿
P
￿
h
0￿￿
= 1
￿
;
or equivalently, P (M￿
0 (h0)) = P (h0), where P (A) denotes the support of the set of mea-
sures: A, i.e., P (A) = [￿2Asupp(￿).
The initial revelation based on (c;R) is a separating outcome if and only if P (c;R(p0;c))
is a singleton for all p0 2 [0;1]. The initial revelation based on (c;R) is a pooling outcome
if and only if P (c;R(p0;c)) = [0;1] for all p0 2 [0;1]. For example, if no agent type opts
out of the default lower bound, ^ p0 = 0 ￿ i.e., if R(p0;c) = 0 for all p0 2 [0;1] ￿ then the
initial revelation based on (c;R) is a pooling outcome. The initial revelation based on (c;R)
is a semi-separating outcome if P (c;R(p0;c)) ￿ [0;1] and P (c;R(p0;c)) is non-singleton for
some p0 2 [0;1].
To conclude this section on learning under ambiguity, note that our model of learning
about the ambiguous parameter p0 can be summarized by the tuple (￿;M0;L(s);￿). This
has marked similarity with Epstein and Schneider (2007); but the di⁄erence warrants some
remarks. First, the likelihood function in our model is derived endogenously from the equi-
librium of the game. In contrast, the likelihood function in Epstein and Schneider (2007) is
exogenously given. Second, as a result, L(s) is a singleton for a given pure strategy pro￿le in
our model. Third, in general ￿ can be interpreted as a preference parameter that re￿ ects the
17decision maker￿ s aversion to type II error in hypothesis testing, i.e., ￿ = 1 means maximum
aversion and ￿ = 0 means maximum tolerance to type II errors. In principle, a preferred
trade o⁄ between type I and II errors should be modelled as part of the overall (subjective)
attitude towards ambiguity. This concern, however, does not arise in our analysis, since the
value of ￿ (for ￿ 2 (0;1]) does not a⁄ect the (deductive) inferential outcome in pure strategy
equilibrium in our model, we can simply assign ￿ = 1 without loss of generality.
3.2 Principal￿ s Objective and Best Response
In Bayesian games in which a player has a prior belief about the environment, speci￿cation
of the player￿ s objective function is straightforward: conditional on the history of play, the
player forms an expectation of the function it seeks to maximize based on the posterior
beliefs implied by that history. However, if the player does not have a unique prior, the
formulation of the player￿ s objective is more complex. Here we describe the objective for
a principal facing ambiguity following approaches inspired by Manski (2008) and GMMS
(2010).
These papers deal with the problem of modelling decision making under uncertainty
when a decision maker does not have enough information to quantify uncertainty using
a single probability measure, which is the situation faced by the principal in this model.
Manski (2008) formulates a two-step procedure in which the ￿rst step is to eliminate all
weakly-dominated actions, and the second step is to maximize (over non-dominated actions)
a not-uniquely speci￿ed utility function (which could be minimum, minimum-regret or ex-
pected utility function). GMMS (2010) axiomatize the problem of a decision maker who
has a pair of preference relations: objectively rational preferences and subjectively ratio-
nal preferences. If the decision maker chooses based on objectively rational preferences, he
can defend his choice to others; if the decision maker chooses based on subjectively ratio-
nal preferences, he cannot be convinced by others that his choice was wrong. Objectively
rational preferences generate a unanimous but incomplete ordering of actions, while subjec-
tively rational preferences generate a complete ordering of actions that can be represented
by a minimum expected utility function (with respect to all priors in the set of the decision
maker￿ s possible priors). GMMS (2010) demonstrate that given two plausible conditions
(consistency and caution), there exists a common set of priors (that can be justi￿ed by a
given set of inference rules) that enable the decision maker￿ s choices to be represented either
by objectively rational preferences or by subjectively rational preferences. This provides a
foundation for decision making based on the maxmim rule; basing decisions on a minimum
expected utility function can be thought of as a way of completing an otherwise incomplete
preference ordering based on objective rationality.
Our formulation can be seen as an extended application of GMMS (2010) to a dynamic
game-theoretic setting. To develop this formulation, we de￿ne, derive, and characterize the
principal￿ s minimum expected utility function ￿ which we call the worst-case value function.
To begin, note that the principal￿ s instantaneous conditional expected utility (conditional
18on (p￿ (K￿;p0);s;p0)) is given by
u￿ (p￿ (K￿;p0)js;p0) = ￿(1 ￿ ￿ + ￿)(y￿ ￿ a￿￿z￿)
￿(￿ + (1 ￿ ￿ + ￿)￿￿)ak￿ (p0) + ￿k￿ (p0)p￿ (K￿;p0)(￿P + ￿￿A);
where ￿k￿ (p0)p￿ (K￿;p0) is the hazard rate of the Poisson (breakthrough) process.
Given (p￿ (K￿;p0);s;p0) the principal￿ s conditional value function is given by
Wt (pt (Kt;p0)js;p0)
=
R 1
t u￿ (p￿ (K￿;p0)js;p0)e￿￿
R ￿
t p k d e￿r(￿￿t)d￿
= ut (pt (Kt;p0)js;p0)dt + e￿(￿ptkt+r)dtWt+dt (pt+dt (Kt+dt;p0)js;p0);
(14)
where the term e￿￿
R ￿
t k p d  is the probability that no breakthrough occurs in the time
interval [t;￿] for ￿ ￿ t conditional on no breakthrough by time t. We can now de￿ne the
principle￿ s worst-case value function:
De￿nition 1 In the absence of a breakthrough prior to time t, the principal￿ s worst-case
value function Ut (ht;s) is determined by the plausible posterior that, for a given pure strategy
equilibrium s = (sP;sA), minimizes the principal￿ s conditional value; i.e.,
Ut (ht;s)
= min￿02cl(M￿
t (ht))
R 1
0 Wt (pt (Kt;p0)js;p0)d￿0 (p0);
(15)
where cl(X) is the closure of set X, i.e., the smallest closed superset of X, or the set of
all limit points of X; the de￿nition of cl(M￿
t (ht)) is based on convergence in distribution
(CDF).
We can immediately establish the following equivalences:
Theorem 2 The principal￿ s worst-case value function has the following equivalent expres-
sions:
(i) Ut (ht;s) = min￿02cl(M￿
t (ht))
R 1
0 Wt (pt (Kt;p0)js;p0)d￿0 (p0);
(ii) Ut (ht;s) = min￿p02cl(D￿
t (ht)) Wt (pt (Kt;p0)js;p0);
(iii) Ut (ht;s) = minp02cl(P(M￿
t (ht))) Wt (pt (Kt;p0)js;p0),
where D￿
t is the largest Dirac subset of M￿
t (ht), P (M￿
t (ht)) is the support of M￿
t (ht)
and cl(X) is the closure of set X; the de￿nition of cl(D￿
t (ht)) is based on convergence in
distribution (CDF).
To develop our notion of equilibrium below, we need to de￿ne the principal￿ s best re-
sponse conditional on her set of accepted posteriors. We build toward that de￿nition by ￿rst
presenting:
19De￿nition 2 The conditional weak dominance relation over SP￿SA conditional on (t;M￿
t (ht)),
denoted by ￿￿
(t;M￿
t (ht)) is de￿ned such that, for 8(sP;sA);(^ sP; ^ sA) 2 SP￿SA, (sP;sA) ￿￿
(t;M￿
t (ht))
(^ sP; ^ sA) i⁄
Z 1
0
Wt (pt (Kt;p0)jsP;sA;p0)d￿0 (p0) ￿
Z 1
0
Wt (pt (Kt;p0)j^ sP; ^ sA;p0)d￿0 (p0);
for all ￿0 2 M￿
t (ht) and
Z 1
0
Wt (pt (Kt;p0)jsP;sA;p0)d￿0 (p0) >
Z 1
0
Wt (pt (Kt;p0)j^ sP; ^ sA;p0)d￿0 (p0);
for some ￿0 2 M￿
t (ht).
To illustrate this de￿nition, we can establish:
Proposition 2 For given t, M￿
t (ht) and 8(sP;sA);(^ sP; ^ sA) 2 SP ￿SA, the following three
statements are equivalent:
(i) (sP;sA) ￿￿
(t;M￿
t (ht)) (^ sP; ^ sA).
(ii)
Wt (pt (Kt;p0)jsP;sA;p0) ￿ Wt (pt (Kt;p0)j^ sP; ^ sA;p0);
for all ￿p0 2 D￿
t (ht), where D￿
t (ht) is the Dirac subset of M￿
t (ht), and
Wt (pt (Kt;p0)jsP;sA;p0) > Wt (pt (Kt;p0)j^ sP; ^ sA;p0);
for some ￿p0 2 D￿
t (ht).
(iii)
Wt (pt (Kt;p0)jsP;sA;p0) ￿ Wt (pt (Kt;p0)j^ sP; ^ sA;p0);
for all p0 2 P (M￿
t (ht)) and
Wt (pt (Kt;p0)jsP;sA;p0) > Wt (pt (Kt;p0)j^ sP; ^ sA;p0);
for some p0 2 P (M￿
t (ht)).
We can now state:
De￿nition 3 For a given t, M￿
t (ht) and sA 2 SA, the principal￿ s set of all conditional best
responses (conditional on (t;M￿
t (ht))) is given by
S
￿
P
￿
sA;t;M
￿
t
￿
h
t￿￿
=
￿
sP 2 SPj
sP 2 argmaxs0
P2SP Ut (ht;s0
P;sA) and
(^ sP;sA) ￿￿
(t;M￿
t (ht)) (sP;sA);8^ sP 2 SP
￿
:
20This de￿nition entails that, informally speaking, sP should not be conditionally weakly
dominated by any 8^ sP 2 SP. Given the agent￿ s strategy sA 2 SA and the principal￿ s
belief represented by M￿
t (ht), the principal￿ s objective is to play her best response sP 2
S￿
P (sA;t;M￿
t (ht)). The principal￿ s preferences over alternative strategies are determined
by the worst-case-scenario performance of these strategies. A (continuation) strategy can
be optimal only if it yields the best worst-case-scenario performance. If there are multiple
strategies that have the best worst-case-scenario performance, only the non-weakly domi-
nated strategies can be optimal.23
Turning now to the agent, the agent￿ s instantaneous utility is given by
v￿ (p￿ (K￿;p0)js;p0) = (y￿ ￿ az￿)
￿a(1 ￿ ￿￿)(k￿ (p0) ￿ z￿) + ￿k￿ (p0)p￿ (K￿;p0)￿A:
Allowing for arbitrary (as opposed to optimal) investment k￿ (p0) 2 [z￿ (p0);1] the agent￿ s
value function is given by
Vt (pt (Kt;p0)js;p0) =
R 1
t v￿ (p￿ (K￿;p0)js;p0)e￿￿
R ￿
t k p d e￿r(￿￿t)d￿
= vt (pt (Kt;p0)js;p0)dt + e￿(￿ktpt+r)dtVt+dt (pt+dt (Kt+dt;p0)js;p0):
(16)
4 Solution Concept
Our solution concept is an extension of the familiar perfect Bayesian equilibrium to a set-
ting in which the uninformed player has multiple priors. We call it the perfect objectivist
equilibrium. The term ￿ objectivist￿is to emphasize the dominant role of objective inference,
i.e., likelihood inference, in learning under ambiguity, as is modelled in the current paper, in
contrast to Bayesian inference that underlines the perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
De￿nition 4 A pure strategy perfect objectivist equilibrium (POE) of the game is a tuple
(s;M;L0 (s)), where M represents the beliefs of the principal; i.e.,
M =
￿
M
￿
t
￿
h
t￿
jh
t 2 H
t;t 2 f0￿2;0￿1g [ [0;1);￿ = 1
￿
;
and the pure strategy pro￿le s = (sP;sA) is a map
s :
￿￿
h
t;t;p0
￿
jh
t 2 H
t;t 2 f0￿2;0￿1g [ [0;1);p0 2 [0;1]
￿
! Gt ￿ Xt;
such that,
(i) for any time t 2 [0;1) and realized history ht, given the conditional posteriors M￿
t (ht),
the continuation strategies derived from sA and sP are mutual best responses. That is, for
all history ht 2 Ht, all t 2 f0￿2;0￿1g [ [0;1),
Vt (pt (Kt;p0)jsP;sA;p0) ￿ Vt (pt (Kt;p0)jsP;s
0
A;p0)
23In the Appendix, we provide an example of a weakly dominated strategy. However, to understand the
example, one must ￿rst understand the equilibrium analysis developed below. For this reason, the example
is presented immediately after the proof of Theorem 4.
21for all s0
A 2 SA for all p0 2 [0;1], and
sP 2 S
￿
P
￿
sA;t;M
￿
t
￿
h
t￿￿
:
(ii) The initial set of posteriors is given by M￿
0￿2 (h0￿2) = M0. The belief updating is through
likelihood inference as described in Section 3.1.3. Speci￿cally, (a) L0 (s); the set of likelihood
functions restricted to strategy pro￿le s; is a singleton; (b) ￿ = 1; i.e., beliefs are updated
through maximum likelihood inference. (c) for all t 2 f0￿2;0￿1g [ [0;1); the set of all
accepted posteriors against history ht is given by M￿
t (ht) along equilibrium path and M0 o⁄
the equilibrium path; The determination of M￿
0 (h0) is as described in Section 3.1.4.
In De￿nition 4, condition (i) requires that given the posteriors for any given history (either
on or o⁄ equilibrium path), all continuation strategies of the agent must be best responses
to the principal￿ s continuation strategies, and subject to this constraints, the continuation
strategies of the principal must be best response too. The above two conditions must also
hold for the special cases: (a) At t = 0￿2, sP (h0￿2;0￿2;p0) = c 2 C,
sP 2 S
￿
P
￿
sA;0￿2;M
￿
0￿2
￿
h
0￿2￿￿
;
(b) At t = 0￿1, sA (h0￿1;0￿1;p0) = R(p0;c) 2 [0;1], and for all s0
A (h0￿1;0￿1;p0) = R0 (p0;c) 2
[0;1]
V0￿1 (p0jsP;sA;p0) ￿ V0￿1 (p0jsP;s
0
A;p0):
Condition (ii) requires that belief updating follows the ￿likelihood inference￿described in
Section 3.1.3 (as opposed to the familiar Bayesian inference). Particularly, it requires that
for any history that is o⁄the equilibrium path, every plausible equilibrium-based prediction
of the play of the game is contradicted by the data and the set of all posteriors reverts to
equal the set of all priors.
The perfect objectivist equilibrium could potentially take many forms. We de￿ne some
of the forms it could take, and we then indicate what it means for a POE to be Pareto
dominant.
4.1 Pooling Equilibrium
A POE is a pooling equilibrium if and only if the initial revelation is a pooling outcome,
that is, if and only if the set of plausible types P (c;R(p0;c)) = [0;1] for all p0 2 [0;1].
The condition re￿ ects the fact that by time t = 0 no private information about p0 has been
(credibly) revealed by the agent through the initial contracting behavior.
4.2 Separating Equilibrium
A POE is a separating equilibrium if and only the initial revelation is a separating outcome,
i.e., if and only if P (c;R(p0;c)) is a singleton for all p0 2 [0;1]. This is possible only if the
principal￿ s mechanism, by time t = 0, can induce the agent to voluntarily reveal his type
truthfully (perhaps subject to some one-to-one mapping) and completely.
224.3 Semi-Separating Equilibrium
A POE is a semi-separating equilibrium if and only if initial revelation is semi-separating,
i.e., if P (c;R(p0;c)) ￿ [0;1] and P (c;R(p0;c)) is non-singleton for some p0 2 [0;1]. This is
possible only if the principal￿ s mechanism, by time t = 0, can induce the agent to voluntarily
reveal his type truthfully but incompletely.
We emphasize that the concepts of pooling, separating, and semi-separating equilibria
pertain to the initial revelation. The fact that the POE is a pooling equilibrium does not
necessarily imply that the equilibrium investment behavior of one agent-type will correspond
to the equilibrium investment behavior of an another agent-type as the game evolves.
4.4 Closed-loop and Markov Perfect Objectivist Equilibrium
In general a closed-loop strategy may depend on the full history ht at time t. In this
model, for every t = 0 continuation game, there exists a set of (payo⁄-relevant) state vari-
ables that su¢ ciently summarize the history ht. They include Kt, ￿t, inf P (M￿
t (ht)) and
supP (M￿
t (ht)), which, in a POE of the continuation game, are known to both players.
In addition, the agent knows p0, which is his private information. Therefore, the players￿
strategies can be expressed as Markov strategies, and the POE of each t = 0 continuation
game is a Markov perfect objectivist equilibrium (MPOE). That is, given the opponent￿ s
Markov strategy, each player￿ s Markov strategy is a best response.
4.5 Pareto Dominant Equilibrium Outcome
De￿nition 5 A Pareto dominant equilibrium outcome is an equilibrium outcome which
Pareto dominates all other (di⁄erent) equilibrium outcomes, that is, in comparison with any
other (di⁄erent) equilibrium outcome, it does not make the principal or any type of the agent
worse o⁄; and it makes either the principal or at least one type of the agent strictly better
o⁄. ￿To make the principal worse o⁄￿means, from the principal￿ s perspective, the outcome
is either weakly conditionally denominated by, or has lower worst-case value than the out-
come in comparison. ￿To make the principal strictly better o⁄￿means, from the principal￿ s
perspective, the outcome weakly conditionally denominates the outcome in comparison.
A Pareto dominant equilibrium outcome, if it exists, is a plausible equilibrium re￿nement.
We return to this point later in the analysis.
5 Characterization of the POE
We start this section by establishing the following generic necessary conditions for a POE.
Lemma 1 A necessary condition for a POE is that the following participation constraints
must be satis￿ed: Ut ￿ 0 for all t 2 f0￿2g [ [0;1) and Vt ￿ 0 for all t 2 f0￿1g [ [0;1).
23We next establish an important condition on the nature of the POE contract between
the principal and the agent.
Proposition 3 A necessary condition for a POE is that, for all ^ p0 2 [0;1],
Z 1
0
Zt (^ p0)e
￿rtdt = 0
and Z 1
0
Yt (^ p0)e
￿rtdt = 0;
which implies that Zt (^ p0) = 0 and Yt (^ p0) = 0 almost everywhere in the time interval [0;1).
This result implies that an equilibrium does not entail either a lump-sum payment or a
minimum investment constraint over any measurable period of time. That is, the equilibrium
contract structure is a linear reimbursement of the agent￿ s investment costs. The intuition
is this. If the principal knew that p0 was very close to 0, mandating a minimum investment
level or providing a lump-sum payment would be a bad policy. The minimum investment
constraint would force the agent to invest under circumstance in which he is nearly certain the
project is doomed to fail, so the necessary compensation (via the lump sum payment, since
recall y ￿ ￿z) that must be provided to the agent to support this minimum investment would
be a waste. Similarly, a lump-sum payment without a minimum investment requirement
would also be wasteful. A much more e¢ cient policy from the principal￿ s perspective would
be taking advantage of its ability to observe the investment level k and tying the agent￿ s
compensation to the observable investment level by means of the reimbursement rate. That
way, if it turns out that p0 really is low, the agent will not invest much, and the principal
would not have to provide much compensation.
Of course, the principal does not know p0, nor does she have a unique prior over p0.
In a POE the principal thus chooses a compensation policy according to the worst-case
value function, which ￿takes into account￿the poor performance of a minimum investment
requirement and a lump-sum subsidy at p0 = 0 into account. (The precise way it does so
can be seen in the proof of Proposition 3.) Expressed in terms of one of the applications
of the model, a government that is averse to ambiguity would prefer to reimburse for the
actual R&D investment a subsidized ￿rm actually does rather than to mandate a minimum
investment level or provide a lump-sum grant (even one that is time limited) because in so
doing it would ensure against the downside that the subsidized ￿rm is actually extremely
pessimistic about the viability of the R&D. If the R&D project is doomed to failure, it may
be best to let the ￿rm reveal that by the length of its commitment to the project.
In the remainder of this section, we proceed as follows. First, we analyze the Markov
perfect objectivist equilibria (MPOE) of t = 0 continuation games. Next, in Section 5.2 we
study the case of a particular pooling equilibrium, where the principal￿ s Markov strategy is a
simple time-invariant reimbursement rate. Finally, in Section 5.3, we establish the uniqueness
of Markov equilibrium outcome.
245.1 MPOE of Continuation Games at t = 0
The Markov strategy of the agent: kt (Kt;￿t;p0) is a function of state variables: Kt, ￿t
and p0. Other state variables such as inf P (M￿
t (ht)) and supP (M￿
t (ht)) do not appear as
arguments of kt (￿) because the relevant information contained in them has been re￿ ected in
Kt and ￿t. Notice, ￿t is a state variable for time t as well as a choice variable of the principal
at time t ￿ dt. Recall that Kt ￿
R t
0 k￿d￿. It follows that Kt+dt ￿ Kt = ktdt.
It can be shown from the ￿rst-order approximation of (16) that Vt (pt (Kt;p0)js;p0) sat-
is￿es the following recursion:
rVt = vt ￿ ￿kt (Kt;￿t;p0)pt (Kt;p0)Vt +
dVt
dt
;
where vt = [￿a(1 ￿ ￿t) + ￿pt (Kt;p0)￿A]kt. Since the agent plays a Markov strategy,
Vt can be written as V (Kt;￿t;p0), where V (￿) does not directly depend on time t. Thus dVt
dt ￿
limdt!0
V(Kt+dt;￿t+dt;p0)￿V (Kt;￿t;p0)
dt can be decomposed as
dVt
dt
=
@V (Kt;￿t;p0)
@Kt
kt +
@V (Kt;￿t;p0)
@￿t
d￿t
dt
:
Since kt is chosen after Kt and ￿t have been determined, and simultaneously (and indepen-
dently) chosen with ￿t+dt, it has no e⁄ects on Kt, ￿t or
d￿t
dt . The Bellman equation for the
agent￿ s optimal investment strategy is thus given by
rV (Kt;￿t;p0) =
@V (Kt;￿t;p0)
@￿t
d￿t
dt
+maxkt2[0;1]
￿￿
￿a(1 ￿ ￿t) + ￿pt (Kt;p0)￿A
￿￿pt (Kt;p0)V (Kt;￿t;p0) +
@V (Kt;￿t;p0)
@Kt
￿
kt
￿
;
Since the expression in the curly bracket is linear in kt, the optimal kt must therefore satisfy
the following condition:
k
￿
t (Kt;￿t;p0) =
8
<
:
1 if pt (Kt;p0) >
a(1￿￿t)￿
@Vt
@Kt
￿(￿A￿Vt)
0 if pt (Kt;p0) ￿
a(1￿￿t)￿
@Vt
@Kt
￿(￿A￿Vt) ;
(17)
i.e., the agent￿ s optimal investment intensity kt only takes values: 1 or 0.24 At a switching
point (if it exists), the following equation holds:
pt (Kt;p0) =
a(1 ￿ ￿t) ￿ @Vt
@Kt
￿(￿A ￿ Vt)
: (18)
24If pt (Kt;p0) =
a(1￿￿t)
￿(￿A￿Vt), the agent strictly prefers kt = 0 to kt = 1 because the latter would make the
cumulative investment Kt+dt at time t + dt overshoot the optimal target (a second- order e⁄ect). If the
worry about ￿overshooting￿can be eased, the agent is indi⁄erent between kt = 0 to kt = 1.
25Consider the special case of a time-invariant reimbursement rate ￿t = ￿ 2 [0;1) for all
t ￿ 0. In that case
k
￿
t (Kt;￿;p0) =
8
<
:
1 if pt (Kt;p0) >
a(1￿￿)￿
@Vt
@Kt
￿(￿A￿Vt) ;
0 if pt (Kt;p0) ￿
a(1￿￿)￿
@Vt
@Kt
￿(￿A￿Vt) ;
(19)
or equivalently
k
￿
t (Kt;￿;p0) =
8
> > <
> > :
1 if Kt < 1
￿ ln
￿￿
￿(￿A￿Vt)
a(1￿￿)￿
@Vt
@Kt
￿ 1
￿
p0
1￿p0
￿
;
0 if Kt ￿ 1
￿ ln
￿￿
￿(￿A￿Vt)
a(1￿￿)￿
@Vt
@Kt
￿ 1
￿
p0
1￿p0
￿
:
(20)
It can be shown that a switching point exists ￿ and k￿
0 (0;￿;p0) = 1, V0 > 0 and @Vt
@Kt
￿ ￿ ￿
t=0
< 0
￿ if and only if
p0 >
a(1 ￿ ￿)
￿￿A
:
Let ^ K (￿;p0) ￿ 1
￿ ln
h￿
￿￿A
a(1￿￿) ￿ 1
￿
p0
1￿p0
i
. Then for Kt = ^ K (￿;p0), V (Kt;￿;p0) = 0 and
@V (Kt;￿;p0)
@Kt
￿ ￿ ￿
Kt= ^ K(￿;p0)
= 0; for Kt 2
h
0; ^ K (￿;p0)
￿
, k￿
t (Kt;￿;p0) = 1 and Kt = t. The agent￿ s
value function Vt satis￿es the following recursive relation:
rVt (pt (Kt;p0)js;p0) = [￿a(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿pt (Kt;p0)￿A]
￿￿pt (Kt;p0)Vt (pt (Kt;p0)js;p0)
￿￿pt (Kt;p0)(1 ￿ pt (Kt;p0))
@Vt(pt(Kt;p0)js;p0)
@pt
The closed-form solution to the above di⁄erential equation is
Vt (pt (Kt;p0)js;p0)
= ￿
a(1￿￿)
r +
￿pt(Kt;p0)
r+￿
h
￿A +
a(1￿￿)
r
i
+ ￿V (￿)pt (Kt;p0)
￿
1￿pt(Kt;p0)
pt(Kt;p0)
￿ r+￿
￿
= ￿
a(1￿￿)
r +
￿
r+￿[￿A+
a(1￿￿)
r ]+￿V (￿)
￿
1￿p0
p0
￿ r+￿
￿ e(r+￿)Kt
1+
1￿p0
p0
e￿Kt ;
where
￿V (￿) =
￿a(1 ￿ ￿)
r(r + ￿)
￿
￿￿A
a(1￿￿) ￿ 1
￿ r
￿
:
For Kt 2
h
0; ^ K (￿;p0)
￿
, Vt (pt (Kt;p0)js;p0) > 0, @Vt
@Kt < 0 and k￿
t (Kt;￿;p0) = 1.
For Kt ￿ ^ K (￿;p0), Vt (pt (Kt;p0)js;p0) = 0, @Vt
@Kt = 0 and k￿
t (Kt;￿;p0) = 0.
When ￿ = 0, the threshold value of cumulative investment is
^ K (0;p0) = K
A (p0); (21)
26where KA (p0) is de￿ned by (7), which is the cumulative investment the agent would be
willing to make in the absence of a payment contract with the principal. If the principal wants
to induce more cumulative investment, she has to o⁄er positive reimbursement when Kt >
KA (p0). Let ~ ￿t (Kt;p0) ￿ 0 be the minimum rate of reimbursement to keep k￿
t (Kt;￿;p0) = 1.
In e⁄ect, ~ ￿t (Kt;p0) embodies the incentive compatibility condition that the principal would
need to respect if she wanted to induce a type-p0 agent to continue to invest ￿ at out given
cumulative investment Kt. Thus, ~ ￿t (Kt;p0) must satisfy
pt (Kt;p0) >
a
￿
1 ￿ ~ ￿t (Kt;p0)
￿
￿ @Vt
@Kt
￿(￿A ￿ Vt)
;
which implies
~ ￿t (Kt;p0) > 1 ￿
1
a
@Vt
@Kt
￿
￿(￿A ￿ Vt)
a
pt (Kt;p0):
For Kt 2
￿
0;KA (p0)
￿
no reimbursement is needed; therefore ~ ￿t (Kt;p0) = 0,
Vt = V (pt (Kt;p0)js;p0)j￿t=0 > 0 and @Vt
@Kt < 0. For Kt 2
￿
0;KA (p0)
￿
￿ KA (p0), the agent
is almost indi⁄erent between kt = 1 and kt = 0; thus Vt ! 0+ and @Vt
@Kt ! 0￿, and the
asymptotic solution is given by:25
~ ￿t (Kt;p0) = max
￿
1 ￿
￿￿A
a
pt (Kt;p0);0
￿
: (22)
To ￿nd the principal￿ s optimal Markov strategy, we also need to know the principal￿ s
preferred termination threshold value for Kt given ~ ￿t (Kt;p0). To determine this, we turn
to the contracting problem faced by a principal when she knows p0. The solution to this
problem is full-information Pareto e¢ cient (allowing for compensation transfer), taking
into account the agent￿ s investment incentive compatibility constraint and transfers to the
agent are potentially socially costly. The ￿rst-order approximation of (14) implies that the
principal￿ s value function Wt = W
￿
Kt; ~ ￿t;p0
￿
satis￿es the following recursive relation:
rWt = ￿
￿
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿ + ￿)~ ￿t (Kt;p0)
￿
akt
+￿ktpt (Kt;p0)(￿P + ￿￿A) ￿ ￿pt (Kt;p0)ktWt + @Wt
@~ ￿t
d~ ￿t
dt + @Wt
@Ktkt:
Let ~ kt be the principal￿ s preferred investment intensity. Then ~ kt must satisfy the following
Bellman equation:
rW
￿
Kt; ~ ￿t;p0
￿
=
@W(Kt;~ ￿t;p0)
@~ ￿t
d~ ￿t
dt
+max~ kt2[0;1]
8
<
:
2
4
￿
￿
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿ + ￿)~ ￿t (Kt;p0)
￿
a
+￿pt (Kt;p0)(￿P + ￿￿A) ￿ ￿pt (Kt;p0)Wt +
@W(Kt;~ ￿t;p0)
@Kt
3
5~ kt
9
=
;
25This is called the asymptotic solution because it is in￿nitesimally smaller than the solution that is needed
to make type p0 agent indi⁄erent between kt = 0 and kt = 1, therefore willing to choose kt = 1.
27Since the expression in the curly bracket is linear in ~ kt, the maximization problem has the
following bang-bang solution:
~ kt (p0) =
8
> <
> :
1 if pt (Kt;p0) >
a(￿+(1￿￿+￿)~ ￿t(Kt;p0))￿
@W(Kt;~ ￿t;p0)
@Kt
￿[(￿P+￿￿A)￿Wt] ;
0 if pt (Kt;p0) ￿
a(￿+(1￿￿+￿)~ ￿t(Kt;p0))￿
@W(Kt;~ ￿t;p0)
@Kt
￿[(￿P+￿￿A)￿Wt] :
(23)
The switching point must be characterized by Wt = 0 and
@W(Kt;~ ￿t;p0)
@Kt = 0 and hence
asymptotically
~ ￿t (Kt;p0)jKt=K￿￿(p0) = ￿
￿￿ ￿
￿P
(1+￿)
￿P
(1+￿) + ￿A
;
where K￿￿ (p0) ￿ 1
￿ ln
￿￿
￿
a
￿
￿P
1+￿+￿A
￿
￿1
￿
p0
1￿p0
￿
is the termination threshold value of Kt. Let
p
￿￿ ￿ pt (K
￿￿ (p0);p0) =
a
￿
￿
￿P
1+￿ + ￿A
￿;
where p￿￿ is the termination threshold value of pt (Kt;p0).
Lemma 2 Suppose (hypothetically) p0 is known to the principal. Suppose the Markov strat-
egy of the agent is given by k￿
t (Kt;￿t;p0) as de￿ned by (17). Then Markov strategy of the
principal, ~ ￿
￿
t+dt (Kt;p0) for all t ￿ 0, is optimal if and only if26
~ ￿
￿
t+dt (Kt;p0) = 8
<
:
0 if Kt 2
￿
0;KA (p0)
￿
1 ￿
￿￿A
a pt+dt (Kt + dt;p0) if Kt 2
￿
KA (p0);K￿￿ (p0)
￿
￿ ￿
￿￿ if Kt ￿ K￿￿ (p0):
(24)
The strategy ~ ￿
￿
t+dt (Kt;p0), given k￿
t (Kt;￿;p0) and conditional on the principal knowing
p0, is Pareto e¢ cient (allowing for compensation transfer) and (subject to this) extracts the
maximum surplus for the principal that is feasible using the short-term contract ￿t+dt.
Lemma 3 Suppose (hypothetically) that p0 is common knowledge. Given appropriate com-
pensation transfer, the following is a Pareto e¢ cient investment policy:
kt =
￿
1 if Kt < K￿￿ (p0)
0 if Kt ￿ K￿￿ (p0): (25)
26The set
￿
0;KA (p0)
￿
is empty if KA (p0) < 0, which is possible because from (7) it follows that KA (p0) <
0 , p0 < pA. The interpretation of a negative threshold KA (p0) is that p0 is too small for the agent to
invest without compensation.
28The problem is that, however, p0 is not known to the principal. Lemma 2 helps explain
why the agent has a good reason not to reveal accurate information about p0. That is, if
the agent did, then the principal would use this information to set ￿t+dt so that it would
reduce the agent￿ s surplus from trade in the future. For this reason, the Markov strategy
k￿
t (Kt;￿;p0) is optimal for the agent only if it does not reveal sensitive information about
p0.
Lemma 4 Suppose the Markov strategy of the agent is given by k￿
t (Kt;￿t;p0) as de￿ned by
(17). With a slight abuse of notation, let inf Pt ￿ inf P (M￿
t (ht)). Then the principal￿ s
Markov strategy ￿
￿
t+dt (Kt;inf Pt) is optimal only if
￿
￿
t+dt (Kt;inf Pt) = 8
<
:
0 if Kt 2
￿
0;KA (inf Pt)
￿
1 ￿
￿￿A
a pt+dt (Kt + dt;inf Pt) if Kt 2
￿
KA (inf Pt);K￿￿ (inf Pt)
￿
￿ ￿
￿￿ if Kt ￿ K￿￿ (inf Pt);
(26)
for all t ￿ 0. Consequently, ￿
￿
t+dt (Kt;inf Pt) is optimal only if ￿
￿
t+dt (Kt;inf Pt) ￿ ￿
￿￿.4
Corollary 1 Let ￿
￿￿
t+dt (Kt;inf Pt) be a Markov strategy of the principal for all t ￿ 0, such
that.
￿
￿￿
t+dt (Kt;inf Pt) = 8
<
:
0 if Kt 2
￿
0;KA (inf Pt)
￿
1 ￿
￿￿A
a pt+dt (Kt + dt;inf Pt) if Kt 2
￿
KA (inf Pt);K￿￿ (inf Pt)
￿
￿
￿￿ if Kt ￿ K￿￿ (inf Pt):
(27)
Then, ￿
￿￿
t+dt (Kt;inf Pt) is optimal.
Lemma 4 provides a necessary condition for the principal￿ s Markov strategy to be optimal,
while Corollary 1 identi￿es a Markov strategy (constructed by setting ￿
￿
t+dt (Kt;inf Pt) = ￿
￿￿
if Kt ￿ K￿￿ (inf Pt)) that is indeed optimal.
5.2 A Pooling Equilibrium
We now de￿ne a candidate pooling equilibrium in which the principal commits to a linear
pricing contract and o⁄ers the agent a reimbursement rate ￿
￿￿ at each instant in time.
De￿nition 6 Let the tuple (s￿￿;M￿￿;L0 (s￿￿)) be such that
(a) at t = 0￿2;
s
￿￿
P
￿
h
0￿2;0￿2
￿
= (0
1;0
1;￿
￿￿) for all ^ p0 2 [0;1];
(b) at t = 0￿1; s￿￿
A is a best response to s￿￿
P for all h0￿1, speci￿cally,
s
￿￿
A
￿
h
0￿1;0￿1;p0
￿
= inf arg max
^ p02[0;1]
￿(^ p0) if Yt (^ p0) = 0 a.e. for all ^ p0 2 [0;1];
29and (c) for all t ￿ 0,
s
￿￿
P
￿
h
t;t
￿
= ￿
￿￿;s
￿￿
A
￿
h
t;t;p0
￿
= k
￿
t (Kt;￿t;p0); (28)
where k￿
t (Kt;￿t;p0) is the Markov strategy de￿ned by (19). L0 (s￿￿) is derived from s￿￿; the
derivation of M￿
t (ht) 2 M￿￿ is as described in Section 3.1.3, M￿
0 (h0) = M0.
Lemma 5 If sP (h0￿2;0￿2) 2 C is such that
R 1
0 Yt (^ p0)e￿rdt > 0 for some ^ p0 2 [0;1], then
s￿￿
A (h0￿1;0￿1;") is such that
R 1
0 Yt (s￿￿
A (h0￿1;0￿1;"))e￿rdt > 0, where " ! 0.
The above lemma reminds us the fact that if the principal o⁄ers positive Yt (^ p0) for some
t ￿ 0, then it would attract the p0 = " ! 0 type of agent. This is suboptimal because the
principal￿ s worst-case value function U0￿2 (h0￿2;s￿￿) would be negative.
We now establish that the candidate pooling equilibrium in De￿nition 6 is indeed a POE.
Theorem 3 The tuple (s￿￿;M￿￿;L0 (s￿￿)) is a pooling pure strategy POE.
In what follows we illustrate how likelihood inference works using the pooling equilibrium
example. It can be shown that (19) is equivalent to
k
￿
t (Kt;￿t;p0) =
￿
1 if p0 > p(Kt;￿t;p0);
0 if p0 ￿ p(Kt;￿t;p0); (29)
where p(Kt;￿t;p0) = 1
1+
2
4 ￿(￿A￿V (Kt;￿t;p0))
a(1￿￿t)￿
@V (Kt;￿t;p0)
@Kt
￿1
3
5e￿￿Kt
. In the pooling equilibrium with ￿t = ￿
￿￿
for all t ￿ 0, P (M￿
0 (h0)) = [0;1].
If k0 = 1 is observed at t = dt, then the principal can infer p0 > p(0;￿
￿￿;p0) ￿ p￿￿
and that p￿￿ is the (non-inclusive) maximum lower bound of p0, i.e., p￿￿ = inf P
￿
M￿
dt
￿
hdt￿￿
and p￿￿ = 2 P
￿
M￿
dt
￿
hdt￿￿
. Also 1 can be inferred as the (inclusive) least upper bound of
p0, i.e., p0 ￿ 1 = supP
￿
M￿
dt
￿
hdt￿￿
and 1 2 P
￿
M￿
dt
￿
hdt￿￿
. If the agent terminates in-
vestment at time t, then it can be inferred that the true type of the agent is given by
p0 = 1
1+
h
￿￿A
a(1￿￿￿￿)￿1
i
e￿￿Kt; otherwise, p(Kt;￿
￿￿;p0) can be inferred, at time t, as the maximum
(non-inclusive) lower bound of p0, and 1 remains the (inclusive) least upper bound. That is,
p0 2
￿
1
1+
h
￿￿A
a(1￿￿￿￿)￿1
i
e￿￿Kt;1
￿
.
If k0 = 0 is observed at t = dt, then it can be inferred that p0 ￿ p￿￿ and p￿￿ the (inclusive)
least upper bound of p0 and 0 is the (inclusive) maximum lower bound, i.e., p0 2 [0;p￿￿].
Formally, in the pooling equilibrium with ￿t = ￿
￿￿ for all t ￿ 0, P (M￿
0 (h0)) = [0;1], if
k0 = 1 is observed at time dt then inf P
￿
M￿
dt
￿
hdt￿￿
= p￿￿ and supP
￿
M￿
dt
￿
hdt￿￿
= 1, and all
p0 2 [p￿￿;1] are plausible. At time t + dt, if kt = 1 is observed, then inf P
￿
M￿
t+dt
￿
ht+dt￿￿
=
1
1+
h
￿￿A
a(1￿￿￿￿)￿1
i
e￿￿Kt, supP
￿
M￿
t+dt
￿
ht+dt￿￿
= 1, and every p0 2
￿
1
1+
h
￿￿A
a(1￿￿￿￿)￿1
i
e￿￿Kt;1
￿
is
plausible. As the agent continues to invest in the absence of a breakthrough, inf Pt gradually
30increases from p￿￿ to supP (M￿
t (ht)) = 1 in a Logistic (di⁄usion) process. Since dinf Pt
dt
1
inf Pt =
￿
1￿p￿￿ [supP (M￿
t (ht)) ￿ inf Pt], ambiguity is reduced smoothly in this case. P (M￿
t (ht)) is a
connected set and P
￿
M￿
t+dt
￿
ht+dt￿￿
￿ P (M￿
t (ht)). All probability distributions (including
all Dirac measures) over the support P (M￿
t (ht)) belong to the plausible set M￿
t (ht).
Along the equilibriumpath, if investment is terminated at time t, then inf P
￿
M￿
t+dt
￿
ht+dt￿￿
=
supP
￿
M￿
t+dt
￿
ht+dt￿￿
= 1
1+
h
￿￿A
a(1￿￿￿￿)￿1
i
e￿￿Kt and only p0 = 1
1+
h
￿￿A
a(1￿￿￿￿)￿1
i
e￿￿Kt is plausible. At
this point, ambiguity is resolved abruptly, and
inf P
￿
M
￿
t0
￿
h
t0￿￿
= supP
￿
M
￿
t0
￿
h
t0￿￿
=
1
1 +
h
￿￿A
a(1￿￿￿￿) ￿ 1
i
e￿￿Kt
for all t0 > t. That is, the true value of p0 becomes known to the principal at time t + dt.
To summarize the pooling equilibrium with a constant reimbursement rate, we have:
￿
￿￿ =
￿P
1+￿
￿P
1+￿+￿A
;
p￿￿ = a
￿
￿
￿P
1+￿+￿A
￿;
K￿￿ (p0) = 1
￿ ln
￿￿
￿
a
￿
￿P
1+￿+￿A
￿
￿1
￿
p0
1￿p0
￿
:
(30)
To understand why the reimbursement rate is given by
￿P
1+￿
￿P
1+￿+￿A
, note that as a consequence of
continuation game perfection at the switching point pt (Ktjp0) = p￿￿ (or equivalently, at Kt =
K￿￿ (p0)), both the principal and the agent are indi⁄erent between kt = 1 and kt = 0. Note
from (2) and (3) that when yt = zt = 0, the agent￿ s expected utility is ￿ktpt￿A ￿(1￿￿t)akt
and the principal￿ s expected utility is ￿ktpt(￿P + ￿￿A) ￿ ((1 + ￿ ￿ ￿)￿t + ￿)akt. For the
agent to be indi⁄erent between kt = 1 and kt = 0, we must have
￿p
￿￿￿A = (1 ￿ ￿
￿￿)a;
and for the principal to be indi⁄erent we must have
￿p
￿￿(￿P + ￿￿A) = (￿ + (1 + ￿ ￿ ￿)￿
￿￿)a;
which, given the agent￿ s indi⁄erence condition, reduces to
￿p
￿￿￿P = (1 + ￿)￿
￿￿a:
Solving these two conditions simultaneously for ￿
￿￿ and p￿￿ gives us the expressions in (30).27
We note that
￿P
1+￿ +￿A (which equals a
￿p￿￿) represents the (normalized) investment cost (for
27We do not need to worry about the case where p￿￿ is a corner solution, i.e., a
￿
￿
￿P
1+￿ +￿A
￿ ￿ 1 because of
Assumption 1.
31kt = 1) incurred by the agent, and thus
￿P
1+￿ is the (normalized) reimbursement received by
the agent.
Even though the principal does not know p0, the cumulative investment level delivered
by a type-p0 agent in the POE described in Theorem 3 is the full-information Pareto e¢ cient
cumulative investment (allowing for compensation transfer). Thus, even though the infor-
mation transmission in equilibrium is minimal, the allocational properties of the equilibrium
are as if the principal actually knew the agent￿ s prior belief.
Theorem 4 The pooling equilibrium given by De￿nition 6 generates a Pareto e¢ cient out-
come, where the invement policy is given by
kt =
￿
1 if Kt < K￿￿ (p0)
0 if Kt ￿ K￿￿ (p0):
Lemma 4 sets an upper bound for the reimbursement rate: ￿t ￿ ￿
￿￿. In the pooling
equilibrium given by De￿nition 6, this upper bound is always binding. Let V ￿￿ (Kt;￿
￿￿;p0)
denote the value function of the agent in this equilibrium. The closed form soultion of
V ￿￿ (Kt;￿
￿￿;p0) is given by
V ￿￿ (Kt;￿
￿￿;p0)
= ￿
a(1￿￿￿￿)
r +
￿
r+￿
￿
￿A+
a(1￿￿￿￿)
r
￿
+￿V (￿￿￿)
￿
1￿p0
p0
￿ r+￿
￿ e(r+￿)Kt
1+
1￿p0
p0
e￿Kt ;
(31)
where ￿V (￿
￿￿) =
￿a(1￿￿￿￿)
r(r+￿)
￿
￿￿A
a(1￿￿￿￿)￿1
￿ r
￿ , for Kt 2 [0;K￿￿ (p0)]. V ￿￿ (Kt;￿
￿￿;p0) = 0 for Kt ￿
K￿￿ (p0).
Given that the investment intensity in this equilibrium is socially e¢ cient at each point
of time and the surplus given to the agent (through the expected bene￿t of breakthrough
and compensation transfer) is maximized, V ￿￿ (Kt;￿
￿￿;p0) must set an upper bound to the
value function of the agent for all MPOE. Furthermore, as we establish in Proposition 4, this
equilibrium generates a Pareto dominant equilibrium outcome in case there exist multiple
equilibrium outcomes. For each possible type of the agent, the POE presented by De￿nition
6 gives the agent its largest payment, while the principal is indi⁄erent between the payo⁄
it receives under this equilibrium and the outcomes under other Markov equilibria if they
exist.
Proposition 4 The pooling equilibrium given by De￿nition 6 generates the Pareto dominant
MPOE outcome if there exist multiple MPOE outcomes.
Let V A (Kt;0;p0) denote the value function of the agent in the absence of compensation
contract with the principal. The closed form soultion of V A (Kt;0;p0) is given by
V
A (Kt;0;p0) = ￿
a
r
+
￿
r+￿
￿
￿A + a
r
￿
+ ￿V (0)
￿
1￿p0
p0
￿ r+￿
￿
e(r+￿)Kt
1 +
1￿p0
p0 e￿Kt ; (32)
32where ￿V (0) = ￿a
r(r+￿)
￿
￿￿A
a ￿1
￿ r
￿ , for Kt 2
￿
0;KA (p0)
￿
. V A (Kt;0;p0) = 0 for Kt ￿ KA (p0).
De￿ne R(Kt;p0) ￿ V ￿￿ (Kt;￿
￿￿;p0) ￿ V A (Kt;0;p0), which is the least upper bound of
(expected) information rent the agent can potentially extract from the contracting with the
principal. More speci￿cally we have
R(Kt;p0) = 8
> > <
> > :
a(￿￿￿)
r +
￿ ￿
r+￿
a￿￿￿
r +[￿V (￿￿￿)￿￿V (0)]
￿
1￿p0
p0
￿ r+￿
￿ e(r+￿)Kt
1+
1￿p0
p0
e￿Kt > 0 if Kt 2
￿
0;KA (p0)
￿
V ￿￿ (Kt;￿
￿￿;p0) > 0 if Kt 2
￿
KA (p0);K￿￿ (p0)
￿
0 if Kt ￿ K￿￿ (p0):
Is it possible for any type of the agent to earn less information rent in any MPOE outcome
than in the current pooling equilibrium? Presumably, each agent type who can potentially
earn positive information rent should have an incentive to protect his information rent (a sort
of natural property right), well, simply by not revealing sensitive private information in the
contracting (and ￿sequential bargaining￿ ) process. Can this kind of motivation e⁄ectively
rule out the existence of (allocationally and distributively) di⁄erent MPOE outcomes? This
is the question to which we turn next.
5.3 Uniqueness of MPOE Outcome
We have just identi￿ed a particular MPOE. Are there other MPOE? We can rule out sepa-
rating equilibria.
Proposition 5 There exists no separating equilibrium.
To understand why separating equilibria are not possible, note that because the principal
seeks to maximize the worst-case value function, she focuses on minimizing the possibility
of funding agent types with low priors. That, coupled with the principal￿ s inability to
commit to a reimbursement rate, deprives her the ability to o⁄er information rents to high
types in exchange for their truth-telling. As a result, a high type has a strong incentive to
misrepresent his prior, which renders separating equilibria impossible.
The nonexistence of separating equilibrium is one instance of the general rule that the
agent (who can potentially earn positive information rent) has an incentive to limit the
revelation of his true type in order to protect his potential information rent. The information
about the agent￿ s type is transmitted through two channels: ￿rst by the initial revelation and
then by the observable ￿ ow of investment kt (and reimbursement claim) in response to the
stream of reimbursement rate ￿t. If the initial revealation is pooling, then no information is
transmitted by it. When initial revelation is semi-separating, it is important to know whether
the information transmitted is sensitive pertaining to information rent. For example, if the
agent has no potential to earn information rent (i.e., p0 < p￿￿), then any level of revelation
about his type is trivial - the information has no e⁄ect on his information rent, which is zero
33anyway. Formally, we make a distinction between trivial and non-trivial semi-separating
equilibria.
De￿nition 7 The initial revelation based on (c;R) is a non-trivial semi-separating out-
come if P (c;R(p0;c)) ￿ [0;1], P (c;R(p0;c)) is non-singleton for some p0 2 [0;1], and
inf P (c;R(p0;c)) > p￿￿ for some p0 2 [0;1]: The initial revelation based on (c;R) is a trivial
semi-separating outcome if P (c;R(p0;c)) ￿ [0;1], P (c;R(p0;c)) is non-singleton for some
p0 2 [0;1], and inf P (c;R(p0;c)) ￿ p￿￿ for all p0 2 [0;1]: A POE is called a non-trivial
semi-separating equilibrium if and only if initial revelation is a non-trivial semi-separating
outcome. A POE is called a trivial semi-separating equilibrium if and only if initial revelation
is a trivial semi-separating outcome.
There are many trivial semi-separating equilibria that give rise to the same allocational
and distributional outcome as the pooling equilibrium de￿ned in De￿nition 6 and established
in Theorem 3.
Lemma 6 There exists an in￿nite set of trivial semi-separating POE. Their (allocative and
distributional) outcomes are identical to the equilibrium de￿ned in De￿nition 6 and estab-
lished in Theorem 3.
For example, such an equilibrium can take the form
￿
￿ s; ￿ M;L0 (￿ s)
￿
such that28
￿ sP
￿
h
0￿2;0￿2
￿
= c(^ p0) = (0
1;0
1;￿
￿￿) for all ^ p0 2 [0;1];
￿ sA
￿
h
0￿1;0￿1;p0
￿
= ￿ R(p0;c) =
￿
p0 if p0 2 [0;p￿￿)
p￿￿ if p0 2 [p￿￿;1] ;
and for 8t ￿ 0 and 8ht 2 Ht,
￿ sP
￿
h
t;t
￿
= ￿ ￿t+dt = ￿
￿￿;
and
￿ sA (ht;t;p0) = k￿
t (Kt;￿t;p0) = 8
<
:
1 if pt (Kt;p0) >
a(1￿￿t)￿
@Vt
@Kt
￿(￿A￿Vt)
0 if pt (Kt;p0) ￿
a(1￿￿t)￿
@Vt
@Kt
￿(￿A￿Vt) :
Obviously, in any of the trivial semi-separating POE described by Lemma 6, the agent￿ s
information rent reaches its upper bound, just as in the pooling POE established in Theorem
3. Intuitively, the reason why the agent￿ s information rent is maximized is because he never
lets the principal know unambiguously that the reimbursement rate ￿
￿￿ is too ￿generous￿
for the agent. Notice, pt (Kt;inf Pt) ￿ p￿￿ (and equivalently Kt ￿ K￿￿ (inf Pt)) holds for
all t ￿ 0. The ambiguity-averse principal therefore can never justify a reduction of ￿t to
below ￿
￿￿ (which is the upper bound of ￿t). If the principal wanted to control the agent￿ s
information rent, she would have to be able to induce the agent to reveal sensitive information
28Note that ￿ M represents the beliefs of the principal corresponding to this speci￿c equilibrium.
34such as pt (Kt;inf Pt) > p￿￿ (when that is the case). The question is: Is that possible in an
equilibrium?
To approach this question, we ￿rst consider, conditional on the initial revelation is pool-
ing, whether the principal can induce the agent to reveal that pt (Kt;inf Pt) > p￿￿ when this
is indeed the case and not yet known to the principal. The answer would be ￿yes￿if the
agent would choose kt = 1 while the principal o⁄ered ￿t < ￿
￿￿, since this choice would reveal
that by condition (17)
pt (Kt;p0) >
a(1 ￿ ￿t) ￿ @Vt
@Kt
￿(￿A ￿ Vt)
￿
a(1 ￿ ￿t)
￿￿A
>
a(1 ￿ ￿
￿￿)
￿￿A
= p
￿￿:
For the marginal type of agent who has Vt = 0, @Vt
@Kt = 0 and pt (Kt;p0) =
a(1￿￿t)
￿￿A , the invest-
ment choice is kt = 0. All higher types of agent must choose kt = 1 (to be explained). There-
fore if kt = 0 is observed the principal can infer that pt (Kt;supPt) =
a(1￿￿t)
￿￿A 2
￿
p￿￿;pA￿
.
When this occurs in an MPOE, the state variables: ￿￿, K￿, inf P￿ and supP￿ all tend to
become stationary for time ￿ ￿ t. The termination level of investment in this case can there-
fore be less than the socially e¢ cient level since K￿ = Kt < K￿￿ (supP￿). The principal will
￿nd it a pro￿table deviation to increase the reimbursement rate from ￿￿ = ￿t to ￿
￿￿ because
the latter weakly dominates the former. This then shows the reimbursement rate ￿t < ￿
￿￿
cannot be an MPOE strategy in the ￿rst place.
Lemma 7 There exists no pooling or trivial semi-separating MPOE such that ￿(Kt;inf Pt) 6=
￿
￿￿ for any (Kt;inf Pt) such that Kt ￿ K￿￿ (inf Pt).
The above lemma rules out any pooling MPOE which is not equivalent to the pooling
MPOE de￿ned in De￿nition 6 and established in Theorem 3. The analysis shows that
the principal faces a trade o⁄ between inducing the marginal low type to invest (socially)
e¢ ciently and reducing the information rents of the higher types. The extreme asymmetry
of information (assumed by our model) between the principal and agent tilts the balance
toward trading with the marginal low type e¢ ciently and tolerating the information rents
earned by the higher types. In equilibrium, a higher type can anticipate this outcome, and
sees the maximal information rent as his ￿natural entitlement￿ . An o⁄er of ￿t < ￿
￿￿ would
be seen as an o⁄-equilibrium path behavior by the principal and would be ￿rejected￿(i.e.,
responding by kt = 0). Formally, let V (Kt;￿t;p0) denote the value function of the agent. For
a higher type agent with pt (Kt;inf Pt) > p￿￿, the value function has the following properties:
V (Kt;￿
￿￿;p0) = V
￿￿ (Kt;￿
￿￿;p0)
and
@V (Kt;￿t;p0)
Kt
! ￿1 for ￿t < ￿
￿￿: (33)
Condition (33) is due to the anticipation that if kt = 1 were chosen, sensitive information
(i.e., pt (Kt;p0) >
a(1￿￿t)
￿￿A ) about the agent￿ s type would be revealed to and used by the
35principal to reduce the agent￿ s information rent, i.e., V (K￿;￿￿;p0) < V (K￿;￿
￿￿;p0) for K￿ 2
[0;K￿￿ (inf Pt)]. Given condition (33) the optimal investment strategy is k￿
t (Kt;￿t;p0) = 0
holds because
pt (Kt;p0) <
a(1 ￿ ￿t) ￿ @Vt
@Kt
￿(￿A ￿ Vt)
= 1:
That is, the agent ￿rejects￿the o⁄er in order not to reveal sensitive information.
Similarly, the agent has an incentive to protect sensitive information at the initial reve-
lation stage. Intuitively, this force may prevent the transmission of non-trivial information
about the agent￿ s type. Indeed, the next lemma rules out the existence of non-trivial semi-
separating MPOE.
Lemma 8 There exists no non-trivial semi-separating MPOE.
By now we have established that in all MPOE no sensitive information about the agent￿ s
type is transmitted to allow the principal to reduce the reimbursement rate to below ￿
￿￿.
Consequently, the agent can extract maximum information rent. The principal￿ s inability
to control the agent￿ s information rent removes one potential distortion to socially e¢ cient
trade between the principal and the agent. The agent￿ s protection of sensitive information
is robust. As a result, the time-invariant reimbursement rate contract is also renegotiation-
proof.
If we con￿ne the solution concept of our analysis to Markov Perfect Objectivist Equi-
librium (MPOE), then the next theorem establishes that there exists a unique equilibrium
(allocational and distributional) outcome. As already established by Theorem 4, this out-
come is also socially e¢ cient (i.e., Pareto e¢ cient, allowing compensation transfer).
Theorem 5 There exists a unique likelihood function based on MPOE that is used by the
principal for likelihood inference, and there is a unique MPOE (allocational and distribu-
tional) outcome.
6 Discussion
The preceding sections show that there is a unique MPOE outcome in the principal-agent
model of delegated experimentation set forth in this paper. In this section we discuss the
comparative statics and other properties of the re￿ned equilibrium outcome. The contract
that implements this outcome is extremely simple: the contract is a pooling contract that
induces no (initial) revelation of information by the agent about p0. Though the principal
could have conceivably used two-part tari⁄-like contracts, the long-term contract structure
to which the principal commits is simple linear pricing, i.e., (yt;zt) = (0;0) for all t. Thus,
the principal never insists on a mandated minimum investment, and only reimburses for the
investment she actually gets through the reimbursement rate ￿t. The reimbursement rate,
which conceivably could have been changed at any point in time by the principal, remains
constant at ￿
￿￿ =
￿P
(1+￿)
￿P
(1+￿)+￿A
until the contract terminates with a breakthrough.
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￿￿ and cut-o⁄ belief p￿￿ have several interesting prop-
erties. First, they do not depend on the intrinsic weight ￿ the principal gives to the agent￿ s
welfare. This is because of the equilibrium alignment between the agent￿ s investment prefer-
ences and those of the principal. As noted in Section 5.2, at the equilibrium cut-o⁄belief p￿￿,
the principal has the same investment preference as the agent. Because of this alignment, it
does not matter how much or how little weight the principal gives the agent￿ s interests: the
cut-o⁄ belief is the same. This property is striking. To appreciate this, consider the case
￿ = 0 in which there are no administrative costs of transfers. Compare two subcases: (i)
￿ ! 1 and (ii) ￿ = 0. For subcase (i), it can be shown that pP ! p￿￿ =
￿P
￿P+￿A, which is also
the ￿rst-best solution (since ￿ = 1 makes the principal a benevolent social planner). That
is, the principal, motivated by her primitive preferences, would fully internalize the agent￿ s
welfare. On the other hand, for subcase (ii) it can be shown that pP = 0 < p￿￿ =
￿P
￿P+￿A.
In this subcase, given her primitive preferences, the principal would like the agent to invest
inde￿nitely unless a breakthrough occurs, but in her equilibrium behavior, as re￿ ected by
p￿￿, the principal acts as if she fully internalizes the agent￿ s welfare. Why does this occur?
Intuitively, ambiguity and ambiguity aversion eliminate the principal￿ s bargaining power. In
e⁄ect, in the MPOE the principal does not seek to minimize the agent￿ s information rent,
and as a result, the agent gets as good a deal as he would have gotten if the principal￿ s
intrinsic preferences had internalized the agent￿ s welfare. By contrast, the agent gains a lot
of bargaining power by having a monopoly over information, and the agent sustains this
monopoly by strategically minimizing his revelation. This kind of extreme asymmetry of
information cannot be captured by a (single-prior) Bayesian model because any probability
distribution is informative to some degree.
Second, the MPOE reimbursement rate has intuitive comparative statics properties with
respect to other model fundamentals. If there were no social costs of transfers (i.e., ￿ = 0),
the agent receives a reimbursement of investment costs at a rate equal to 1 minus its share
of contribution to the total prize. If the agent contributed (almost) nothing to total prize
(i.e., ￿A ! 0)￿ which means that the agent has (almost) no intrinsic motivation to invest in
solving the problem￿ it would receive (almost) a pure cost-reimbursement contract. In the
R&D application, we can rewrite ￿
￿￿ as
1￿￿
1￿￿+(1+￿)￿, where ￿ ￿
￿A
￿A+￿P is the appropriability
ratio, i.e., the fraction of the bene￿ts of an R&D breakthrough that the ￿rm can appropriate.
If the appropriability ratio tends to 0, ￿
￿￿ = 1, and the ￿rm receives (almost) a pure cost
reimbursement contract. On the other hand, if the ￿rm can appropriate the full bene￿t,
￿
￿￿ = 0, and no R&D subsidy is needed. When ￿ 2 [0;1), the cost sharing works to align
the interest of the government, which cares about the social prize and the cost of subsidizing
the ￿rm and the ￿rm, which cares about its private prize and incurs the direct cost of R&D.
Finally, as pointed out above, in equilibrium the principal does not employ the tools of
a minimum investment level or a lump-sum payment, even though we assumed that it has
signi￿cant commitment power with respect to these instruments and can structure them in
many di⁄erent ways. For example, in the R&D application, the assumed contract space
would allow the government to provide the subsidized ￿rm with a time-limited lump-sum
grant of funds, coupled with a mandate of a minimum investment level. Yet, our model
37predicts that the government would use a pure matching subsidy. Because time-limited
grants and restrictions on how funds are used are common features of government funding
of R&D, one might naturally wonder if we can reconcile the predictions of our model with
subsidy mechanisms actually used in practice. To see one simple and plausible way to do
so, suppose ￿A ! 0 (which is quite natural for basic research). In this case, ￿
￿￿ ! 1
and boundary between using a pure matching subsidy with reimbursement rate ￿
￿￿ and
using a time-limited lump-sum grant of funds with zt = 1 is a blur. Suppose, too, that the
transaction cost of a long-term contract, denoted by ￿y, is less than that of a short-term
contract, denoted ￿￿, i.e., ￿￿ > ￿y ￿ 0. This is a plausible assumption if observing kt in
real time is very costly. For su¢ ciently large ￿￿ ￿ ￿y it is plausible that a time-limited
lump-sum grant of funds with zt = 1 is strictly better than a pure matching subsidy with
reimbursement rate ￿
￿￿. To determine the optimal length of a time-limited lump-sum grant,
it is necessary that the principal￿ s information about p0 be better than complete ignorance.
An implication of this analysis is that to the extent that time-limited government grants are
utilized, it would be because the government is able to overcome its ambiguity and develop
its own prior beliefs about the viability of the research project or program being funded.
One could interpret the government￿ s reliance on panels of outside experts (e.g., as in the
process of funding by the National Science Foundation) as a mechanism by which this is
accomplished. One would expect that the value of such expertise would be particularly high
if investment k was not observable and the government could no longer reimburse using a
matching subsidy.
7 Summary and Conclusions
In this paper, we study a dynamic game of incomplete information in a model of delegated
experimentation. The principal seeks a solution to a problem and contracts with an agent
to ￿nd it, but a solution to the problem may not exist. Neither the principal nor the agent
knows for certain whether the problem can be solved, but the agent￿ s expertise allows him to
formulate a prior probability p0 that the problem is solvable. This prior belief is private in-
formation to the agent. Unlike standard models of contracting with asymmetric information,
we do not assume that the principal has a unique prior distribution over the agent￿ s prior.
Instead, we allow the principal to hold multiple prior distributions over p0. This gives rise
to a process by which the principal iteratively selects beliefs over p0 based on observational
facts and a likelihood function that is derived from the common knowledge about the game
and the concept of equilibrium. Following the work of Manski (2008) and GMMS (2010),
the principal is assumed to maximize a worst-case value function that re￿ ects an aversion to
ambiguity. As a solution concept for the game, we propose an extension of perfect Bayesian
equilibrium to a setting in which the uninformed principal has multiple priors. We call this
extension the perfect objectivist equilibrium, or POE. We fully characterize the Markov per-
fect objectivist equilibrium or MPOE for the game of delegated experimentation, and show
that there is a unique MPOE outcome, in which the principal o⁄ers the agent a simple linear
contract that involves a time-invariant reimbursement of the agent￿ s costs of investment in
38solving the problem. This induces the agent to choose the investment pro￿le and cumulative
investment that is Pareto e¢ cient (allowing for compensation). The reimbursement rate has
appealing comparative statics properties, and in our showcase application ￿ government
subsidies for basic scienti￿c research ￿ it can be shown to depend in a sensible and interest-
ing way on the extent to which the subsidized form can appropriate a portion of the social
bene￿t from an R&D breakthrough.
The idea that the principal may not be able to form a single prior over private infor-
mation has potentially broad applicability. In principle, it allows better representation of
ignorance in a player￿ s belief and hence more adequate account of the extent and scope of
informational asymmetry between players. This is a breakthrough relative to the conven-
tional Bayesian mechanism design literature. For example, in mechanism design models of
optimal regulation (Baron and Myerson, 1982; La⁄ont and Tirole, 1986) or of non-linear
pricing (Maskin and Riley, 1984), the principal￿ s (single) prior belief plays a critical role in
shaping the nature of the mechanism. We intend to explore how the possibility multiple
priors held by an ambiguity-averse principal changes the implications of these important
benchmark models. In preliminary work (Besanko, Tong, Wu, 2011), we ￿nd that the Baron
and Myerson mechanism does not emerge as a POE29 when the principal can hold multiple
priors.
A number of extensions of the delegated experimentation model presented here are also
possible, perhaps especially in the context of the R&D subsidy application. As indicated
in Section 6, it would be useful to explore conditions under which standard R&D funding
mechanisms, such as time-limited restricted grants, can be rationalized using the framework
developed here. More generally, we hope that the concept of multiple priors and the POE
can provide a valuable framework for analyzing delegated experimentation with even richer
structures than the setting explored here. Among the interesting extensions in this direction
would be exploration of general contract spaces, unobservable action pro￿les that give rise to
noisy signals, noise due to measurement errors, and the possibility that a given agent may be
replaced by other agents if performance in achieving a breakthrough seems unsatisfactory.
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The proof is essentially identical to that of Proposition 3.1 in Keller, Rady and Cripps (2005)
and is thus omitted. The last inequality is obvious.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 1
Given the pure strategy equilibrium with strategy pro￿le s, for each realization of p0 the
equilibrium path is given by ft (s;p0) and the likelihood function is uniquely given by
29More precisely we refer to the counterpart of ￿perfect objectivist equilibrium￿in a static game, which is
called ￿objectivist Nash equilibrium￿(ONE), as an extension to conventional ￿Bayesian Nash equilibrium￿ .
39l(ht;t;s;p0) = ￿ft(s;p0) (ht). Given the realized history ht it can be inferred that all con-
ditional plausible states belong to P (ht). This necessity imposes the following restriction on
M￿
t (ht):
M
￿
t
￿
h
t￿
=
￿
￿0 2 M0j￿0
￿
P
￿
h
t￿￿
= 1
￿
:
As a result,
max~ ￿02M0
~ l2L0(s)
L
￿
ht; ~ ￿0;~ l
￿
= max~ ￿02M0
R 1
0 ￿ft(s;p0) (ht)d~ ￿0 (p0
0)
=
R 1
0 ￿ft(s;p0) (ht)d￿p0 (p0
0)
￿ ￿
￿
p02P(ht)
= ￿ft(s;p0) (ht)
￿ ￿
p02P(ht) = ￿ht (ht) = 1:
It then follows from (11) and (13) that
f￿0 2 M0j￿0 (P (ht)) = 1g
=
n
￿t (ht;￿0;l)j￿0 2 M0;
R 1
0 ￿ft(s;p0) (ht)d￿0 (p0) ￿ ￿
o
=
n
￿t (ht;￿0;l)j￿0 2 M0;1 >
R 1
0 ￿ft(s;p0) (ht)d￿0 (p0) ￿ ￿
o
[
n
￿t (ht;￿0;l)j￿0 2 M0;
R 1
0 ￿ft(s;p0) (ht)d￿0 (p0) = 1
o
=
n
￿t (ht;￿0;l)j￿0 2 M0;1 >
R 1
0 ￿ft(s;p0) (ht)d￿0 (p0) ￿ ￿
o
[f￿0 2 M0j￿0 (P (ht)) = 1g;
where the last equality is due to the fact
￿t
￿
p0jh
t;￿0;l
￿
=
￿ft(s;p0) (ht)￿0 (p0)
R 1
0 ￿ft(s;p0) (ht)d￿0 (p0)
= ￿0 (p0)
for ￿0 2 M0 such that
R 1
0 ￿ft(s;p0) (ht)d￿0 (p0) = 1. The result implies either
￿
￿t
￿
h
t;￿0;l
￿
j￿0 2 M0;1 >
Z 1
0
￿ft(s;p0)
￿
h
t￿
d￿0 (p0) ￿ ￿
￿
= ?; (34)
or n
￿t (ht;￿0;l)j￿0 2 M0;1 >
R 1
0 ￿ft(s;p0) (ht)d￿0 (p0) ￿ ￿
o
2 f￿0 2 M0j￿0 (P (ht)) = 1g:
(35)
The above (overall) condition can be satis￿ed if ￿ = 1, which implies (34). However, ￿ = 1
is not necessary to satisfy the above (overall) condition. To see this, let ￿0
0 (p0) = ￿￿~ p0 (p0)+
(1 ￿ ￿)￿^ p0 (p0) for all p0 2 [0;1], 8 ~ p0 2 P (ht), 8^ p0 = 2 P (ht) and 8￿ 2 (0;1). Then R 1
0 ￿ft(s;p0) (ht)d￿0
0 (p0) = ￿ 2 (0;1) and
￿t (p0jht;￿0
0;l) =
￿ft(s;p0)(ht)￿0
0(p0)
R 1
0 ￿ft(s;p0)(ht)d￿0
0(p0)
=
￿￿ft(s;p0)(ht)￿~ p0(p0)
￿
R 1
0 ￿ft(s;p0)(ht)d￿~ p0(p0) = ￿ft(s;p0) (ht)￿~ p0 (p0) = ￿~ p0 (p0):
Thus
￿t
￿
h
t;￿
0
0;l
￿
= ￿~ p0 2
￿
￿0 2 M0j￿0
￿
P
￿
h
t￿￿
= 1
￿
;
that is condition (35) is satis￿ed.
40A.3 Proof of Theorem 2
Recall that P (A) denote the support of probability measures in A: As a preliminary step,
we establish that the support of cl(M￿
t (ht)) equals cl(P (M￿
t (ht))), i.e.,
P
￿
cl
￿
M
￿
t
￿
h
t￿￿￿
= cl
￿
P
￿
M
￿
t
￿
h
t￿￿￿
:
First, we show cl(P (M￿
t (ht))) ￿ P (cl(M￿
t (ht))). Since P (M￿
t (ht)) ￿ P (cl(M￿
t (ht)))
by de￿nition, we only need to show cl(P (M￿
t (ht)))nP (M￿
t (ht)) ￿ P (cl(M￿
t (ht))). This
trivially holds if cl(P (M￿
t (ht)))nP (M￿
t (ht)) = ?. We thus focus on the non-trivial case.
Let ￿ p0 be such that ￿ p0 2 cl(P (M￿
t (ht)))nP (M￿
t (ht)), that is, ￿ p0 is a boundary point
of P (M￿
t (ht)). Without loss of generality, we assume limN!1 pN
0 2 P (M￿
t (ht)), where
pN
0 = ￿ p0 + "
N 2 P (M￿
t (ht)), N 2 N, " 2 (0;1). Claim: ￿￿ p0 2 cl(M￿
t (ht))nM￿
t (ht), that is,
￿￿ p0 is a boundary point of M￿
t (ht). This claim is true due to the fact ￿pN
0 2 M￿
t (ht) and
￿￿ p0 = limN!1 ￿pN
0 = 2 M￿
t (ht). It follows that ￿ p0 2 P (cl(M￿
t (ht))).
Second, we show P (cl(M￿
t (ht))) ￿ cl(P (M￿
t (ht))). Since
P
￿
M
￿
t
￿
h
t￿￿
￿ P
￿
cl
￿
M
￿
t
￿
h
t￿￿￿\
cl
￿
P
￿
M
￿
t
￿
h
t￿￿￿
by de￿nition, we only need to show
P (cl(M￿
t (ht)))nP (M￿
t (ht)) 2 cl(P (M￿
t (ht))). This trivially holds if
P (cl(M￿
t (ht)))nP (M￿
t (ht)) = ?. We thus focus on the non-trivial case. The nontrivial
case, which can be restated as P (cl(M￿
t (ht)))ncl(P (M￿
t (ht))) 6= ?, has two subcases:
(a) ￿(P (cl(M￿
t (ht)))ncl(P (M￿
t (ht)))) > 0 and ￿ has no mass point at p0
0 for all p0
0 2
P (cl(M￿
t (ht)))ncl(P (M￿
t (ht))), for all ￿ 2 cl(M￿
t (ht))nM￿
t (ht). (b) There exists a
measure ￿ 2 cl(M￿
t (ht))nM￿
t (ht) and p0
0 2 P (cl(M￿
t (ht)))ncl(P (M￿
t (ht))) such that ￿
has a mass point at p0
0.
De￿ne the CDF F￿ such that
F￿ (p0) ￿
Z p0
0
d￿(x)
for all p0 2 [0;1], where ￿ 2 cl(M￿
t (ht))nM￿
t (ht). Since every ￿ is a limit point of M￿
t (ht),
by de￿nition, there exists a sequence ￿N 2 M￿
t (ht) such that
lim
N!1
F￿N (p0) = F￿ (p0) (36)
for all p0 2 [0;1] such that F￿ (p0) is continuous, where F￿N (￿ p0) ￿
R ￿ p0
0 d￿N (x) for all
￿ p0 2 [0;1] and hence F￿N is the CDF derived from ￿N.
Subcase (a). By de￿nition, F￿ (p0) is continuous for p0 2 P (cl(M￿
t (ht)))ncl(P (M￿
t (ht))),
for all ￿ 2 cl(M￿
t (ht))nM￿
t (ht). Because both ￿ and ￿N are de￿ned on the Borel sigma
algebra of unit intervals. If there exits p0 2 P (cl(M￿
t (ht)))ncl(P (M￿
t (ht))); then there
are two subsubcases.
41(a.1) First, there exists an interval (p1;p2) where p1 < p0 < p2 and
(p1;p2) ￿ P
￿
cl
￿
M
￿
t
￿
h
t￿￿￿
ncl
￿
P
￿
M
￿
t
￿
h
t￿￿￿
:
Then there must exist p0
1 2 (p1;p0) such that F￿ is continuous at p0
1. We must have
limN!1 F￿N (p0) = limN!1 F￿N (p0
1) = F￿ (p0
1) < F￿ (p0). The ￿rst equality is due to that
F￿N is ￿ at over [p0
1;p0] for all N 2 N. The second is due to that F￿ is continuous at p0
1.
Hence we have a contradiction.
(a.2) Second, for all p0 2 P (cl(M￿
t (ht)))ncl(P (M￿
t (ht))); there is no such interval
(p1;p2) such that p1 < p0 < p2 and (p1;p2) ￿ P (cl(M￿
t (ht)))ncl(P (M￿
t (ht))); then
p0 must be a limit point of cl(P (M￿
t (ht))): Because cl(P (M￿
t (ht))) is closed, p0 2
cl(P (M￿
t (ht))); we have a contradiction.
We therefore have shown that subcase (a) is empty.
Subcase (b). We want to show P (cl(M￿
t (ht)))nP (M￿
t (ht)) 2 cl(P (M￿
t (ht))). Sup-
pose the opposite, then P (cl(M￿
t (ht)))ncl(P (M￿
t (ht))) is non-empty. Then there must
exist ￿0 2 cl(M￿
t (ht))nM￿
t (ht) and p0
0 2 P (cl(M￿
t (ht)))ncl(P (M￿
t (ht))) such that ￿0 has
a mass point at p0
0. Since F￿0 has a jump at p0
0 and is right-continuous at p0
0 it follows
F￿0
￿
p
0
0+
￿
= lim
N!1
F￿N
￿
p
0
0+
￿
:
We further distinguish three subsubcases: (b.1) p0
0 = 0; (b.2) p0
0 2 (0;1); (b.3) p0
0 = 1
(b.1) p0
0 = 0: There must exists " > 0 such that (0;")
T
P (M￿
t (ht)) = ? and F￿0 (p0) is
continuous in p0 for all p0 2 (0;"). On the one hand,
lim
N!1
F￿N (p0) = F￿0 (p0) > 0:
On the other hand, since F￿N (p0) = 0 for all N 2 N, we must have
lim
N!1
F￿N (p0) = 0:
The above is a contradiction, which implies case (b.1) is empty.
(b.2) p0
0 2 (0;1): There must exists " > 0 such that ((p0
0 ￿ ";p0
0)
S
(p0
0;p0
0 + "))
T
P (M￿
t (ht)) =
? and F￿0 (p0) is continuous in p0 for all p0 2 (p0
0 ￿ ";p0
0) and F￿0 (p00
0) is continuous in p00
0 for
all p00
0 2 (p0
0;p0
0 + "). On the one hand,
lim
N!1
F￿N (p0) = F￿0 (p0) < F￿0 (p
00
0) = lim
N!1
F￿N (p
00
0):
On the other hand, since F￿N (p0) = F￿N (p0
0) = F￿N (p00
0), we must have
lim
N!1
F￿N (p0) = lim
N!1
F￿N (p
0
0) = lim
N!1
F￿N (p
00
0):
We have therefore derived a contradiction which implies that case (b.2) is also empty.
42(b.3) p0
0 = 1: There must exists " > 0 such that (1 ￿ ";1)
T
P (M￿
t (ht)) = ? and F￿0 (p0)
is continuous in p0 for all p0 2 (1 ￿ ";1). On the one hand,
lim
N!1
F￿N (p0) = F￿0 (p0) < 1:
On the other hand, since F￿N (p0) = F￿N (1) = 1, we must have
lim
N!1
F￿N (p0) = lim
N!1
F￿N (1) = 1:
We have therefore derived a contradiction which implies that case (b.3) is empty too.
Note, By Theorem 1, M￿
t (ht) is the set of all probability measures over the set P (ht),
where P (ht) is the set of p0 such that ht is predicted by ft (s;p0): This implies
P
￿
M
￿
t
￿
h
t￿￿
= P
￿
h
t￿
;
P
￿
D
￿
t
￿
h
t￿￿
= P
￿
h
t￿
;
and that D￿
t (ht) is the set of all Dirac measures over set P (ht).
As another preliminary step, we show
P
￿
cl
￿
D
￿
t
￿
h
t￿￿￿
= cl
￿
P
￿
D
￿
t
￿
h
t￿￿￿
:
The argument is similar to the one above, thus omitted.
Next we note that cl(D￿
t (ht)) is the set of all Dirac measures over the set cl(P (D￿
t (ht))).
This is obvious because by de￿nition cl(D￿
t (ht)) is the set of all Dirac measures over the set
P (cl(D￿
t (ht))).
Now we prove the main claims. First, (i),(ii) is due to the fact that cl(M￿
t (ht))
includes cl(D￿
t (ht)), which contains all Dirac measures over cl(P (M￿
t (ht))). All members
of cl(M￿
t (ht)), including all solutions of the minimization problem in expression (i), are a
convex combination of some Dirac measures over cl(P (M￿
t (ht))). There must exist a corner
solution to the minimization problem in expression (i), that is a Dirac measure that belongs
to cl(D￿
t (ht)) and also minimizes Wt (pt (Kt;p0)js;p0). To see this, let ~ ￿0 2 cl(M￿
t (ht)) be
a worst-case distribution. Let P (~ ￿0) be the support of ~ ￿0. Then there must exist ~ p0 2 P (~ ￿0)
such that ￿~ p0 is also a worst-case distribution. Suppose the opposite, that is,
Wt (pt (Kt; ~ p0)js; ~ p0) >
Z 1
0
Wt (pt (Kt;p0)js;p0)d~ ￿0 (p0)
for all ~ p0 2 P (~ ￿0). Integrating both sides of the above inequality w.r.t. ~ ￿0 (~ p0) over P (~ ￿0),
we have
R
~ p02P(~ ￿0) Wt (pt (Kt; ~ p0)js; ~ p0)d~ ￿0 (~ p0) >
R 1
0 Wt (pt (Kt;p0)js;p0)d~ ￿0 (p0)
,
R 1
0 Wt (pt (Kt;p0)js;p0)d~ ￿0 (p0) >
R 1
0 Wt (pt (Kt;p0)js;p0)d~ ￿0 (p0)
which is a contradiction. Since ￿~ p0 2 cl(D￿
t (ht)) ￿ cl(M￿
t (ht)), ￿~ p0 must also solve the
minimization problem in expression (ii). As a result, (i),(ii).
Finally, (ii),(iii) is obvious because cl(D￿
t (ht)) is the set of all Dirac measures over the
set cl(P (M￿
t (ht))).
43A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
The result follows immediately from De￿nition 2.
A.5 Proof of Lemma 1
The result follows immediately from De￿nition 4.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 3
Suppose the opposite, that is, there exists a perfect objectivist equilibrium (s;M;L0 (s))
such that sP (h0￿2;0￿2) = (Z;Y;￿0) 2 C and 9^ p0 2 [0;1] such that
R 1
0 Yt (^ p0)e￿rtdt > 0,
because Yt (^ p0) ￿ aZt (^ p0) holds for any feasible contract (Z;Y;￿0) and for all ^ p0 2 [0;1].
We must have
R 1
0 Zt (^ p0)e￿rtdt > 0 or
R 1
0 [Yt (^ p0) ￿ aZt (^ p0)]e￿rtdt > 0. Without loss of
generality, we can consider (Z;Y;￿0) as the most favorable initial contract for the agent
type p0 = " ! 0; otherwise, the favorable contract must be some
￿
^ Z; ^ Y ; ^ ￿0
￿
2 C such that
R 1
0 ^ Yt (^ p0)e￿rtdt > 0. It then follows,
U0￿2 (h0￿2;s)
= minp02[0;1] W0 (p0js;p0)
￿ lim"!0 W0 ("js;")
= ￿
R 1
0 [(1 ￿ ￿ + ￿)(Y￿ (^ p0) ￿ aZ￿ (^ p0)) + (1 + ￿)aZ￿ (^ p0)]e￿r￿d￿
< 0 = U0 (h0￿2;s0;sA);
where s0
P (h0￿2;0￿2) = (Z0;Y 0;￿0
0) 2 C such that Z0
t (^ p0) = 0 and Y 0
t (^ p0) = 0, and ￿0
t (^ p0) = 0
for all ^ p0 2 [0;1] and all t ￿ 0; the third equality follows from the de￿nition of W0 and the
contract requires k￿ ￿ Z￿: This implies that s is suboptimal for the history (0￿2;h0￿2), thus
contradicts the de￿nition of an equilibrium (i.e., POE).
A.7 Proof of Lemma 2
Given the agent￿ s strategy k￿
t (Kt;￿t;p0); the principal chooses ~ ￿
￿
t+dt (Kt;p0) and induces the
agent to follow the socially e¢ cient investment strategy speci￿ed by (23). Hence ~ ￿
￿
t+dt (Kt;p0)
must be optimal because it allows the principal to extract the maximum surplus.
To show the necessity, we note that for Kt 2
￿
0;KA (p0)
￿
, the principal must set
~ ￿
￿
t (Kt;p0) = 0 otherwise she can increase her payo⁄by lowering ~ ￿
￿
t (Kt;p0) without changing
the agent￿ s investment level. Further more, we know
lim
Kt!K￿￿(p0)
~ ￿
￿
t (Kt;p0) = ￿
￿￿
where K￿￿ (p0) is the optimal termination threshold value of Kt. This implies for Kt 2 ￿
KA (p0);K￿￿ (p0)
￿
; we also have ~ ￿
￿
t (Kt;p0) = ~ ￿t (Kt;p0): Finally, for Kt ￿ K￿￿ (p0), we
44need to have ￿
￿
t (Kt;p0) ￿ ￿
￿￿ otherwise the agent will overinvest. As a result,
~ ￿
￿
t+dt (Kt;p0)
=
8
<
:
0 if Kt 2
￿
0;KA (p0)
￿
1 ￿
￿￿A
a pt+dt (Kt + dt;p0) if Kt 2
￿
KA (p0);K￿￿ (p0)
￿
￿ ￿
￿￿ if Kt ￿ K￿￿ (p0);
is a necessary condition for ~ ￿
￿
t+dt (Kt;p0) to be optimal.
A.8 Proof of Lemma 3
Lemma 2 implies that the compensation strategy ~ ￿
￿
t+dt (Kt;p0) can induce the investment
policy given by (25), keep the agent￿ s value the same as if there is no compensation transfer,
and strictly improve and maximize the principal￿ s value for all Kt ￿ 0 in the absence of a
breakthrough. The outcome is obviously Pareto e¢ cient for all Kt ￿ 0 in the absence of a
breakthrough.
A.9 Proof of Lemma 4
Given the agent￿ s Markov investment strategy, de￿ned by (17), reimbursement strategy
￿
￿
t+dt (Kt;inf Pt) as de￿ned by (26) is su¢ cient to induce k￿
t (Kt;￿;p0) = 1 for all p0 2
[inf Pt;1] if Kt 2 [0;K￿￿ (inf Pt)).
Given the agent￿ s Markov investment strategy, de￿ned by (17), we will prove that the
strategy ￿
￿
t+dt (Kt;inf Pt) as de￿ned by (26) is necessary. We divide our proof by discussing
three cases.
Case 1: Kt 2
￿
0;KA (inf Pt)
￿
.
In this case, Kt 2
￿
0;KA (inf Pt)
￿
since
￿
0;KA (inf Pt)
￿
￿
￿
0;KA (p0)
￿
. Then Lemma 2
implies ￿
￿
t+dt (Kt;inf Pt) is optimal if and only if ￿
￿
t+dt (Kt;inf Pt) = 0.
Case 2: Kt 2
￿
KA (inf Pt);K￿￿ (inf Pt)
￿
.
In this case, p0 > inf Pt: De￿ne p0
0 = inf Pt + " where " ! 0 to be the lowest realization
of p0: For the subcase p0 = p0
0, we have Kt 2
￿
KA (p0
0);K￿￿ (p0
0)
￿
because KA (p0
0) !
KA (inf Pt) and K￿￿ (p0
0) ! K￿￿ (inf Pt). Then Lemma 2 implies ￿
￿
t+dt (Kt;inf Pt) is uniquely
asymptotically optimal for this subcase.
Claim: The subcase p0 = p0
0 is the worst case for ￿
￿
t+dt (Kt;inf Pt).
To see this, we need to show that Wt (pt (Kt;p0)js￿;p0), where s￿
A (ht;t;p0) = k￿
t (Kt;￿t;p0),
s￿
p (ht;t) = ￿
￿
t+dt (Kt;inf Pt), is increasing in p0 for p0 ￿ p￿￿. First note that for ￿ 2
[0;K￿￿ (p0)), k￿ = 1, K￿ = ￿; for ￿ ￿ K￿￿ (p0), k￿ = 0; and K￿ = K￿￿ (p0). Then for
￿ ￿ K￿￿ (p0); we have
u￿ (p￿ (K￿;p0)js
￿;p0) = ￿(￿ + (1 ￿ ￿ + ￿)￿￿)a + ￿p￿ (￿;p0)(￿P + ￿￿A)
and
Wt (pt (Kt;p0)js￿;p0) =
R 1
t u(p￿js￿;p0)e￿￿
R ￿
t p k d e￿r(￿￿t)d￿
=
R K￿￿(p0)
t [￿(￿ + (1 ￿ ￿ + ￿)￿￿)a + ￿p￿ (￿;p0)(￿P + ￿￿A)]e￿￿
R ￿
t p k d e￿r(￿￿t)d￿;
45where
K
￿￿ (p0) ￿
1
￿
ln
2
4
￿
￿
a
￿
￿P
1+￿ + ￿A
￿
￿ 1
￿
p0
1 ￿ p0
3
5;
dK￿￿ (p0)
dp0
=
1
￿
1
p0 (1 ￿ p0)
;
and
dWt(pt(Kt;p0)js￿;p0)
dp0
=
R K￿￿(p0)
t ￿(￿P + ￿￿A)
dp￿(￿;p0)
dp0 e￿￿
R ￿
t p d e￿r(￿￿t)d￿
￿
R K￿￿(p0)
t ￿[￿(￿ + (1 ￿ ￿ + ￿)￿￿)a + ￿p￿ (￿;p0)(￿P + ￿￿A)]
R ￿
t
@p 
@p0 d e￿￿
R ￿
t p d e￿r(￿￿t)d￿
+ [￿(￿ + (1 ￿ ￿ + ￿)￿￿ (p0))a + ￿p￿ (￿;p0)(￿P + ￿￿A)]e￿￿
R ￿
t p d e￿r(￿￿t)￿ ￿
￿=K￿￿(p0)
dK￿￿(p0)
dp0
=
R K￿￿(p0)
t ￿(￿P + ￿￿A)
p￿(1￿p￿)
p0(1￿p0)e￿￿
R ￿
t p d e￿r(￿￿t)d￿
￿
R K￿￿(p0)
t ￿[￿(￿ + (1 ￿ ￿ + ￿)￿￿)a + ￿p￿ (￿;p0)(￿P + ￿￿A)]
R ￿
t
p (1￿p )
p0(1￿p0) d e￿￿
R ￿
t p d e￿r(￿￿t)d￿
+ [￿(￿ + (1 ￿ ￿ + ￿)￿
￿￿)a + ￿p
￿￿ (￿P + ￿￿A)]
| {z }
=0
e￿￿
R ￿
t p d e￿r(￿￿t)
￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿
￿=K￿￿(p0)
1
￿
1
p0(1￿p0)
=
R K￿￿(p0)
t ￿(￿P + ￿￿A)
p￿(1￿p￿)
p0(1￿p0)e￿￿
R ￿
t p d e￿r(￿￿t)d￿
+
R K￿￿(p0)
t
[￿(￿+(1￿￿+￿)￿￿)a+￿p￿(￿;p0)(￿P+￿￿A)]
p0(1￿p0)
R ￿
t dp e￿￿
R ￿
t p d e￿r(￿￿t)d￿
=
R K￿￿(p0)
t ￿(￿P + ￿￿A)
p￿(1￿p￿)
p0(1￿p0)e￿￿
R ￿
t p d e￿r(￿￿t)d￿
+
R K￿￿(p0)
t
[￿(￿+(1￿￿+￿)￿￿)a+￿p￿(￿;p0)(￿P+￿￿A)]
p0(1￿p0) (p￿ ￿ pt)e￿￿
R ￿
t p d e￿r(￿￿t)d￿
= 1
p0(1￿p0)
R K￿￿(p0)
t ￿(￿P + ￿￿A)p￿ [(1 ￿ p￿) + (p￿ ￿ pt)]e￿￿
R ￿
t p d e￿r(￿￿t)d￿
+ 1
p0(1￿p0)
R K￿￿(p0)
t (￿ + (1 ￿ ￿ + ￿)￿￿)a(pt ￿ p￿)e￿￿
R ￿
t p d e￿r(￿￿t)d￿
> 0;
where the third equality uses the fact that
dpt
dt = ￿￿pt (1 ￿ pt) for all kt = 1:
Since the subcase p0 = p0
0 is the worst case for ￿
￿
t+dt (Kt;inf Pt), then ￿
￿
t+dt (Kt;inf Pt)
must be uniquely asymptotically optimal for Case 2. To see this, note that
maxsp Ut (ht;sp;s￿
A) ￿ maxsp Wt (pt (Kt;p0)jsp;s￿
A;p0)jp0=p0
0
< Wt
￿
pt (Kt;p0)js￿
p;s￿
A;p0
￿￿
￿
p0=p0
0
= Ut
￿
ht;s￿
p;s￿
A
￿
;
where we use the de￿nition of Ut and Proposition 2. This implies the worst case value of
￿
￿
t+dt (Kt;inf Pt) is higher than the worst case value of every alternative Markov strategy.
Case 3: Kt ￿ K￿￿ (inf Pt). There are two subcases:
Subcase 3.1: Kt ￿ K￿￿ (supP (M￿
t (ht))). In this subcase, Kt ￿ K￿￿ (p0), then Lemma
2 implies ￿
￿
t+dt (Kt;inf Pt) is optimal if and only if ￿
￿
t+dt (Kt;inf Pt) 2 [0;￿
￿￿].
Subcase 3.2: Kt 2 [K￿￿ (inf Pt);K￿￿ (supP (M￿
t (ht)))). We claim ￿t+dt (Kt;inf Pt) >
￿
￿￿ cannot be optimal. To see this, notice, ￿
￿
t+dt (Kt;inf Pt) = ￿
￿￿ = 1 ￿
￿￿A
a p￿￿ > 1 ￿
46￿￿A
a pt (Kt;p0); which implies ￿
￿￿ is su¢ cient to induce all types of agent with pt (Kt;p0) > p￿￿
to invest k￿
t (Kt;￿t;p0) = 1 and all types of agent with pt (Kt;p0) ￿ p￿￿ not to invest; this is
Pareto e¢ cient (allowing for compensation transfer). O⁄ering ￿t+dt (Kt;inf Pt) > ￿
￿￿ would
attract the agents with type pt (Kt;p0
0) = p￿￿￿", (" ! 0) to invest k￿
t (Kt;￿t;p0
0) = 1 because
p0
0 2 P (M￿
t (ht)). This is not optimal for the principal because it leads to lower payo⁄ for
the principal.
To prove the last part of the lemma, notice for Kt 2
￿
KA (inf Pt);K￿￿ (inf Pt)
￿
the
expression 1 ￿
￿￿A
a pt+dt (Kt + dt;inf Pt) ￿ 1 ￿
￿￿A
a pt+dt (K￿￿ (inf Pt);inf Pt) = 1 ￿
￿￿A
a p￿￿ =
￿
￿￿. It follows that ￿
￿
t+dt (Kt;inf Pt) ￿ ￿
￿￿ for all cases.
A.10 Proof of Corollary 1
In the proof of Lemma 4 we have established that for Cases 1 and 2, ￿t+dt (Kt;inf Pt) =
￿
￿
t+dt (Kt;inf Pt) is both necessary and su¢ cient for ￿t+dt (Kt;inf Pt) to be optimal. Now
we show that for Case 3, ￿t+dt (Kt;inf Pt) = ￿
￿￿ is optimal. To see this, note it ensures
zero worst case value, which is the maximum, and is uniquely asymptotically optimal if
p0 = p￿￿ + ", where " ! 0 and therefore cannot be conditionally weakly dominated.
Since ￿
￿￿
t+dt (Kt;inf Pt) = ￿
￿
t+dt (Kt;inf Pt) for Cases 1 and 2, and ￿
￿￿
t+dt (Kt;inf Pt) = ￿
￿￿,
￿
￿￿
t+dt (Kt;inf Pt) must be optimal for all three cases.
A.11 Proof of Lemma 5
Suppose the opposite, that is,
R 1
0 Yt (^ p0)e￿rdt > 0 for some ^ p0 2 [0;1], and p0 = " ! 0
type agent declares ^ p0 = s￿￿
A (h0￿1;0￿1;") such that
R 1
0 Yt (s￿￿
A (h0￿1;0￿1;"))e￿rdt = 0. As
a result this type of agent does not invest, receives no payment and has value V0￿1 = 0.
If the agent declares ^ p0 = s￿￿
A (h0￿1;0￿1;") such that
R 1
0 Yt (s￿￿
A (h0￿1;0￿1;"))e￿rdt > 0, she
will get at least some in￿nitesimal positive value V0￿1, which will be pro￿table deviation. A
contradiction is thus derived.
A.12 Proof of Theorem 3
To establish (s￿￿;M￿￿;L0 (s￿￿)) constitutes a POE, we need to establish part (i) and (ii) of
De￿nition 4. Part (ii) has been established by discussion in Section 3.1.3 and Section 3.1.4
and De￿nition 6. Hence we are left to prove part (i), which requires us to establish s￿￿
P and
s￿￿
A are best response to each other for all t 2 f0￿2;0￿1g and [0;1). We will proceed in four
steps.
Claim (i): s￿￿
A is a best response to s￿￿
P for all t ￿ 0 and all ht 2 Ht.
This claim results from the fact that the strategy k￿
t (Kt;￿t;p0) is the agent￿ s optimal
Markov investment strategy conditional on that the change in kt has no ￿nite e⁄ect on Vt.
The condition attached is satis￿ed because ￿t+dt = ￿
￿￿ is constant, therefore is not a⁄ected
by change in kt. Since the calculation of Vt is based on ￿t+dt = ￿
￿￿, the change in kt has no
￿nite e⁄ect on Vt.
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A , for all t ￿ 0, s￿￿
P is a best response to s￿￿
A .
This is implied by Corollary 1 since given s￿￿
A , ￿
￿￿
t+dt (Kt;inf Pt) = ￿
￿￿ = s￿￿
P (ht;t) both on
and o⁄ equilibrium path. This implies pt (K￿￿jinf Pt) ! p￿￿ on an equilibrium path, which
coincides with the principal￿ s preferred strategy as de￿ned by equation (23). In addition,
o⁄ equilibrium path, inf Pt = 0 which then implies K￿￿ (inf Pt) < 0. So the principal has no
incentive to deviate.
Claim (iii): s￿￿
A (h0￿1;0￿1;p0) = inf argmax^ p02[0;1] ￿(^ p0) if Yt (^ p0) = 0 a.e. for all ^ p0 2
[0;1]
Given s￿￿
P (ht;t;p0) = ￿
￿￿ for all t ￿ 0 and all ht 2 Ht, it is a best response for the
agent to play s￿￿
A (h0￿1;0￿1;p0) = inf argmax^ p02[0;1] ￿(^ p0) if Yt (^ p0) = 0 a.e. for all ^ p0 2 [0;1]
because the principal￿ s strategy for t ￿ 0 is independent of the agent￿ s report of ^ p0 at time
0￿1:
Claim (iv): For all t = 0￿2, s￿￿
P is a best response to s￿￿
A .
Note,
minp02[0;1] W0￿2 (p0js￿￿
P ;s￿￿
A ;p0) = 0 = maxsP2SP U0￿2 (h0￿2jsP;s￿￿
A )
= maxsP2SP minp02[0;1] W0 (p0jsP;s￿￿
A ;p0): (37)
Also, we claim given s￿￿
A , s￿￿
P is never conditionally weakly dominated by any sP 2 SP. To
see this, suppose the opposite, that is, there exists sP 2 SP, such that
(sP;s
￿￿
A ) ￿
￿ ￿
0￿2;M￿
0￿2(h0￿2)
￿ (s
￿￿
P ;s
￿￿
A ):
Then, given that s￿￿
A is (by de￿nition) a best response to s￿￿
P for all h0￿1 at t = 0￿1, Lemma 5
implies positive Yt (^ p0) would result in negative value for the principal if p0 = " ! 0, implying
(sP;s￿￿
A ) ￿￿ ￿
0￿2;M￿
0￿2(h0￿2)
￿ (s￿￿
P ;s￿￿
A ), therefore sP must be such that Yt (^ p0) = 0 a.e. for all
^ p0 2 [0;1]. Then s￿￿
A (h0￿1;0￿1;p0) = inf argmax^ p02[0;1] ￿(^ p0) applies. The t = 0 continuation
game will always be based on a pooling initial revelation. Then s￿￿
P (ht;t) = ￿
￿￿ is uniquely
asymptotically optimal for p0 = p￿￿ + ", where " ! 0, which implies s￿￿
P (ht;t) = ￿
￿￿ cannot
be conditionally weakly dominated by sP, and thus a contradiction is delivered.
A.13 Proof of Theorem 4
For ￿ = ￿
￿￿, the termination investment level is given by ^ K (￿;p0) = K￿￿ (p0). The pooling
equilibrium given by De￿nition 6 therefore generates the same investment policy (i.e., given
by (25)) that is induced by compensation strategy ~ ￿
￿
t+dt (Kt;p0) under full information. Since
the investment policy is a Pareto e¢ cient allocation of resource, the di⁄erence between the
two outcomes in question is purely distributional and due to the di⁄erence between the
two compensation transfers. Both outcomes are Pareto e¢ cient because in each case it is
impossible to make one player better o⁄ without making the other worse o⁄.
48A.14 An Example of Weakly Dominated Strategy Which Satis￿es
the maxmin Criterion
Consider the (arti￿cial) set of agent types:
￿
0;pA￿
. We argue that the following strategy
of the principal, which is to o⁄er no compensation to the agent, is a weakly dominated
strategy which satis￿es the maxmin criterion. To see this, note that the aforementioned the
strategy is weakly dominated by the time-invariant pooling reimbursement strategy ￿t = ￿
￿￿,
conditional on the agent￿ s investment strategy being given by (19). For all pt 2 [0;p￿￿] and
t ￿ 0 both strategies give the same value of Wt, which is zero and also the minimum value.
For all pt 2
￿
p￿￿;pA￿
and all t ￿ 0, strategy ￿t = ￿
￿￿ gives strictly larger value of Wt than
the strategy of no compensation.
A.15 Proof of Proposition 4
For all equilibrium outcomes (if there exist multiple of them), U0￿2 = 0 and none of them
is weakly dominated by any other equilibrium outcome. At t = 0￿2, the principal is ￿in-
di⁄erent￿between them. Among all the equilibrium outcomes, the agent gets the highest
reimbursement rate and hence the largest amount of payment from the principal from the
pooling equilibrium given by De￿nition 6 or its outcome-equivalent equilibria. This outcome
makes each type of the agent best o⁄. In any other equilibrium outcome (if it exists), some
type of the agent is strictly worse o⁄ than in the pooling equilibrium given by De￿nition
6. Therefore the pooling equilibrium given by De￿nition 6 generates the Pareto dominant
equilibrium outcome.
A.16 Proof of Proposition 5
Suppose the opposite, that is, there exists a separating equilibrium, such that P (c;R(p0;c))
is a singleton for all p0 2 [0;1]. Then inf Pt = inf P (c;R(p0;c)) = p0. Lemma 3 implies
that (z1;y1) = (0;0). Let ￿t+dt (Kt;inf Pt) = sP (ht;t). For sP to be optimal, it must
provide no payment to any agent type p0 2 [0;p￿￿), which entails for all p0 2 [0;p￿￿],
￿t+dt (Kt;inf Pt) ￿ ~ ￿
￿
t+dt (Kt;inf Pt) as de￿ned in (24). Also, for sP to be optimal, it must be
such that for all p0 2 (p￿￿;1], ￿t+dt (Kt;inf Pt) = ~ ￿
￿
t+dt (Kt;inf Pt). This reimbursement rate,
which maximizes social surplus and leaves no information rent for the agent, however, cannot
be incentive compatible (i.e., optimal) for the p0 = 1 type agent to voluntarily choose. To
see this, note that if the agent p0 = 1 reveals his type, he will be o⁄ered a contract speci￿ed
in Lemma 3. We distinguish two cases.
Case (i): a
￿￿A ￿ 1 which implies KA (1) = 1. In this case the agent receives no payment
from the principal. However, pretending to be any p0 2 (p￿￿;1) type agent, his investment
cost will be covered partially before he stops investing and thus earns him some positive
information rent. Thus, we reach a contradiction.
Case (ii): a
￿￿A > 1 which implies KA (1) < 0. In this case the agent receives reimburse-
ment at the constant rate ~ ￿
￿
t+dt (Kt;1) = 1 ￿
￿￿A
a , which gives him no information rent.
49However, pretending to be any p0 2 (p￿￿;1) type agent, he will get a higher reimbursement
rate thus earns some positive information rent. Thus, we reach a contradiction.
A.17 Proof of Lemma 6
The result follows immediately from Theorem 3 and the example
￿
￿ s; ￿ M;L0 (￿ s)
￿
.
A.18 Proof of Lemma 7
Suppose the opposite, that is, there exists a pooling or trivial semi-separating MPOE such
that ￿(Kt;inf Pt) 6= ￿
￿￿ for some state (Kt;inf Pt) such that Kt ￿ K￿￿ (inf Pt). Since Lemma
26 rules out ￿(Kt;inf Pt) > ￿
￿￿, then we only consider ￿(Kt;inf Pt) < ￿
￿￿ for some state
(Kt;inf Pt) such that Kt ￿ K￿￿ (inf Pt). The argument that leads from here to a contradiction
has been provided in the text proceeding the lemma, apart from the explanation why all
higher (than marginal) types of agent must choose kt = 1. We now provide the explanation
as follows: If a higher type agent chose kt = 0, then in an MPOE, the state variables: ￿￿,
K￿, inf P￿ and supP￿ (or supP (M￿
t (ht))) would all tend to become stationary for time
￿ ￿ t. As result, V￿ would tend to be V￿ = Vt = 0, which would be suboptimal for the agent,
and this contradicts the supposition that kt = 0 is optimal for the higher type agent.
A.19 Proof of Lemma 8
Suppose the opposite, that is, there exists at least one non-trivial-semi-separating MPOE.
Let (c;R) represent such an equilibrium. Thus, Q(p￿￿ + ") ￿ fp0jR(c;p0) = R(c;p￿￿ + ")g
is the set of agent types which are indistinguishable from the marginal low type p￿￿ + " by
the initial revelation. The principal has to o⁄er ￿0 = ￿
￿￿ to this group of types. Otherwise, if
￿0 < ￿
￿￿ were o⁄ered and k0 = 0 were observed the principal would ￿nd a pro￿table deviation
(as opposed to keeping the reimbursement rate at ￿0) to increase the reimbursement rate
to ￿
￿￿ immediately, i.e., setting ￿0 < ￿
￿￿ is not time-consistent. There must exist at least
another group of types which all exceed or equal supQ(p￿￿ + "). The principal must o⁄er
￿0 < ￿
￿￿ (which is a necessary condition for optimal strategy, see Lemma 26) to the latter
group. Therefore the marginal (lowest) type of the latter group must have incentive to
pretend to belong to the former group, which violates the incentive compatibility constraint
for the non-trivial-semi-separating equilibrium.
A.20 Proof of Theorem 5
Since we have ruled out the existence of any separating or non-trivial semi-separating MPOE,
all MPOE that can exist are either pooling or trivial semi-separating equilibria that are
(allocationally and distributionally) equivalent to the pooling MPOE de￿ned in De￿nition 6
and established in Theorem 3.
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